The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wm. R. Wilson, Jr. United States District Judge
Pending is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8). Plaintiff has not responded. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part.
Plaintiff, an African-American female, was employed as a patient care technician at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences ("UAMS"), and, on April 21, 2006, was fired for insubordination.*fn1 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), charging that she was terminated because of her race and sex, and because of a disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). On August 29, 2006, the EEOC issued its Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue,*fn2 finding that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the ADA and was fired for insubordination. After exhausting her administrative remedies, Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint asserting that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, race discrimination, retaliation, and termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.*fn3
A complaint, while construed in favor of the plaintiff,*fn4 must allege facts sufficient to state a claim as a matter of law.*fn5 Although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, "they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced."*fn6 "[P]ro se litigants must set forth [a claim] in a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law."*fn7
Defendants' first argue that Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Bryson*fn8 and Conners*fn9 should be dismissed because they are not "employers" as defined by Title VII.*fn10 Plaintiff names Defendants Bryson and Conners in her Complaint without specifying whether she is suing them in their official or individual capacities. "If the complaint does not specifically name the defendant in [her] individual capacity, it is presumed [s]he is sued only in [her] official capacity."*fn11 Individual employees cannot be held personally liable under Title VII;*fn12 however, individual state actors can be sued under Title VII in their "official capacities."*fn13 Moreover, a state agency is an employer under Title VII;*fn14 and claims against the state and its agencies are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.*fn15 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Defendants Bryson and Conners in their official capacities remain.
Defendant UAMS Units 6B/4A argues that it is not a proper party defendant because individual hospital units are not separate legal entities capable of being sued. Defendant is correct. "UAMS is the name of a campus which is a part of the University of Arkansas, an institution of higher education established under Arkansas law."*fn16 "UAMS is not a separate institution or a corporate body which has the capacity to sue or be sued."*fn17 Therefore, all claims against UAMS or any of its individual hospital units are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In conclusion, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII allegations against the individual defendant's in their "individual capacities" is GRANTED, but the claims against them in their official capacities remain. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Title VII claims against UAMS is GRANTED.