JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. 34CR-10-144. HONORABLE HAROLD S. ERWIN, JUDGE.
Richard Ingram, Pro se, appellant.
PRO SE MOTIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO COMPLETE THE RECORD, FOR ACCESS TO TRANSCRIPT, AND FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF
In 2012, appellant Richard Ingram was found guilty by a jury in the Jackson County Circuit Court of capital murder for the death of his twenty-three-month-old son, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. This court affirmed. Ingram v. State, 2013 Ark. 446. In 2014, appellant timely filed a verified, pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2012), asserting two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and appellant timely lodged an appeal of that order in this court. Now before us are appellant's pro se motions for certiorari to complete the record, for access to the transcript, and for extension of time to file brief.
In the motion for writ of certiorari to complete the record before us, appellant asks this court to compel the circuit clerk to complete the record with six exhibits attached to a document filed below that is part of the record on appeal. Four of the six exhibits are included in the record as separately filed documents. Because appellant fails to demonstrate that the omitted documents contain any specific information that is pertinent to the issues raised in the petition, the motion for writ of certiorari is denied.
Because it is clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal, we dismiss the appeal, and appellant's remaining motions are moot. An appeal of the denial of postconviction relief will not be allowed to proceed when it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Holliday v. State, 2013 Ark. 47 (per curiam); Bates v. State, 2012 Ark. 394 (per curiam); Martin v. State, 2012 Ark. 312 (per curiam).
A review of the petition and the order reveals no error in the trial court's decision to deny relief. When considering an appeal from a trial court's denial of a Rule 37.1 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the sole question presented is whether, based on a totality of the evidence under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective. Taylor v. State, 2013 Ark. 146, 427 S.W.3d 29.
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be " whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Pursuant to Strickland, we assess the effectiveness of counsel under a two-prong standard. First, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the " counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007). There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance, and an appellant has the burden of overcoming this presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions of trial counsel, which, when viewed from counsel's perspective at the time of the trial, could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55; McCraney v. State, 2010 Ark. 96, 360 S.W.3d 144 (per curiam). Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance so prejudiced petitioner's defense that he was deprived of a fair trial. Holloway v. State, 2013 Ark. 140, 426 S.W.3d 462. A petitioner making an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must show that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Abernathy v. State, 2012 Ark. 59, 386 S.W.3d 477 (per curiam). The petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. The language, " the outcome of the trial," refers not only to the finding of guilt or innocence, but also to possible prejudice in sentencing. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Id. " [T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
In his petition, appellant summarily alleged that, although a mental evaluation was conducted to determine his competency to stand trial, counsel was ineffective for failing to move for an evaluation to determine his " state of mind" at the time of the crime and whether he had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Appellant also seemed to make the conclusory allegation that counsel was remiss in not calling an expert witness to testify with regard to his mental state at the ...