United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division
November 7, 2014
JAMIE SHAWN MCCALL, ADC #610019, PLAINTIFF
SHERIFF SHOCK, et al., DEFENDANTS
Jamie Shawn McCall, ADC #610019, Plaintiff, Pro se, Dermott, AR.
For Shock, Sheriff, Faulkner County, Lloyd Vincent, Captain, Faulkner County Jail (originally named as Vincient), Defendants: Colin P. Wall, Rainwater, Holt & Sexton P.A., Little Rock, AR.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
JEROME T. KEARNEY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The following partial recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Judge D. P. Marshall Jr. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.
If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at the same time that you file your written objections, include the following:
1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate.
2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before the District Judge (if such a hearing is granted) was not offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge.
3. The detail of any testimony desired to be introduced at the hearing before the District Judge in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or other non-testimonial evidence desired to be introduced at the hearing before the District Judge.
From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.
Mail your objections and " Statement of Necessity" to:
Clerk, United States District Court
Eastern District of Arkansas
600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149
Little Rock, AR 72201-3325
Plaintiff Jamie McCall is a state inmate incarcerated at the Delta Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). He filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement while incarcerated at the Faulkner County Jail in 2013.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, which this Court construes as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 35). Defendants filed a Response in opposition to the Motion (Doc. Nos. 37-38).
II. Motion for Injunctive Relief
In the present Motion, Plaintiff states that in the past when he has returned to the Jail for court appearances, he has been required to sleep on a mat on the floor of a cell for up to five days. He asks the Court to order Defendants not to require him to do so in the future.
In Response, Defendants state Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts which require the issuance of a temporary restraining order or hearing, as set forth in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C.L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). In addition, Plaintiff fails to show how he will sustain irreparable harm if his request is not granted.
In considering whether to grant injunctive relief, the Court must consider the following factors: " (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest." Dataphase Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d at 113. No single factor is dispositive, but the movant must establish a threat of irreparable harm. Id. Without a finding of irreparable injury, a preliminary injunction should not be issued. Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 1999). " The burden of proving that a preliminary injunction should be issued rests entirely with the movant." Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995). The Court in Goff also addressed the district court's role in inmate applications for injunctive relief as follows: " [I]n the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution because 'judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration...[t]he courts should not get involved unless either a constitutional violation has already occurred or the threat of such a violation is both real and immediate.'" Id. at 520-21 (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)).
Having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion and Defendants' Response, the Court finds Plaintiff provides no evidence of a threat of irreparable harm to support a hearing under Dataphase. First, he is not currently being housed at the Jail, and provides no information concerning when he might be housed there in the future. Next, there is no absolute Eighth Amendment right to be placed in a cell with bedding. Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995). In Williams, the Court held that the plaintiff inmate's four-day stay in a strip cell without any clothing or bedding did not violate his Eighth Amendment rights. Rather, the courts look to whether the conditions of confinement result in the " denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. at 445. Plaintiff's present allegation -- that he possibly could be incarcerated in a cell where he is required to sleep on a mat on the floor for an indeterminate period of time -- does not state a constitutional claim for relief and does not support a finding of irreparable injury.
In addition, the Court hesitates to involve itself in the problems of prison administration, absent more specific allegations to show that a " threat of such a violation is both real and immediate." Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d at 520-21. Therefore, in light of the Dataphase considerations, and the standard set forth in Goff v. Harper, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to require a hearing under Dataphase, and therefore, his Motion should be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, which this Court construes as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 35), is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.