Kevin L. Schriener, Plaintiff - Appellant
Quicken Loans, Inc., Defendant - Appellee Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc., Defendant
Submitted March 13, 2014
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis.
For Kevin L. Schriener, Plaintiff - Appellant: Ronald J. Eisenberg, Robert Schultz, SCHULTZ & ASSOCIATES, Chesterfield, MO.
For Quicken Loans, Inc., Defendant - Appellee: Richard A. Ahrens, John M. Hessel, Patrick J. Thornton, LEWIS & RICE, Saint Louis, MO.
Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
Kevin Schriener appeals from the district court's dismissal of his claims against Quicken Loans, Inc. and the denial of his motion to alter or amend the judgment. We affirm.
Schriener's complaint sets forth the following facts. In June 2011, Schriener obtained a residential mortgage from Quicken Loans that was secured by a deed of trust. Quicken Loans acquired the deed of trust that the parties used from Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. (" Wolters Kluwer" ) for a fee. Quicken Loans also assisted Wolters Kluwer in preparing the deed of trust by providing necessary information. The deed of trust, however, was not written or reviewed by an attorney licensed to practice law in Missouri. In connection with Schriener's residential mortgage, Quicken Loans charged him an " origination charge" of $575.00 and " adjusted origination charges" of $1,705.63. These charges are reflected on the parties' HUD-1 settlement statement (" HUD-1" ), which Schriener attached to his complaint. The HUD-1 does not list a fee for the preparation of the deed of trust.
Schriener filed a putative class action against Quicken Loans in Missouri state court, alleging that Quicken Loans improperly engaged in law business under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.020; violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (" MMPA" ), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 et seq.; and was unjustly enriched. After Quicken Loans removed the matter to federal court, the district court dismissed Schriener's claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denied Schriener's motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). This appeal followed.
We review de novo the district court's grant of Quicken Loans's motion to dismiss, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Schriener. See Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 764 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 2014). In addition to the allegations in the complaint, we may consider those materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Id. " To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The parties agree that Missouri law applies.
We begin with Schriener's claim that Quicken Loans improperly engaged in law business under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.020 by procuring the deed of trust from Wolters Kluwer. Missouri law defines " law business," in relevant part, as " the drawing or the procuring of or assisting in the drawing for a valuable consideration of any paper, document or instrument affecting or relating to secular rights." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.010.2. The ...