United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
JOHN SHIPP and JOYCE SHIPP, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE d/b/a FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, Defendant.
SUSAN O. HICKEY, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (ECF No. 35), and Plaintiffs' response in opposition (ECF No. 43). The Court has also considered Plaintiffs' Motion for leave to File Amended Complaint and Supplemental Exhibit. (ECF Nos. 42 & 45). Defendant has responded in opposition to this motion. (ECF No. 51). For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint should be DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should be GRANTED.
The named Plaintiffs, John Shipp and Joyce Shipp ("the Shipps"), were under a homeowner's insurance policy issued by the Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Farmers"). The Shipps suffered a covered loss to their insured property on April 1, 2008. On April 7, 2008, Farmers estimated the cost to repair the property at $5, 369.94, a total that included the cost of labor and materials. Farmers paid the Shipps the "actual cash value" of their loss, which was $3, 293.55 after subtracting depreciation and the amount of the deductible. The depreciated amount included both the cost of labor and materials. The Shipps, in their Complaint, argue that Arkansas law prohibits an insurance company from depreciating the cost of labor. Therefore, by depreciating this cost, Plaintiffs claim that Farmers (1) breached its contract with Plaintiffs and (2) was unjustly enriched.
II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The Court will assess Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings using its Complaint as originally filed in state court in Miller County, Arkansas. Defendant has requested the Court dismiss this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is barred as a matter of law by the applicable five-year limitations period, and Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is barred as a matter of law by the applicable three-year limitations period. Defendant asserts that these holdings are consistent with rulings recently issued by this Court in other labor depreciation cases containing identical fraudulent concealment allegations.
Under Arkansas law, a breach of contract claim arising out of a written contract is subject to a five-year statute of limitations. Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-56-111(b); Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA Inc., 935 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Ark. 1996). Unjust enrichment carries a three-year statute of limitations. Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-56-105. These statutes begin running on the date the breach or injury occurs, not when it is discovered, unless the limitations period is tolled. Chalmers, 326 Ark. at 901. Both breach of contract and unjust enrichment, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, would have occurred at the time Farmers allegedly required the Plaintiffs to pay more than what they should have paid in accordance with their contract, April, 2008. Because more than five years passed from that time until this action was filed in November 2013, both the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims should normally be dismissed due to the running of the limitations period for such claims.
However, the applicable statutes of limitations may be tolled on the basis of fraudulent concealment. Once it is clear from the face of the complaint that an action is barred by an applicable statute of limitations, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to prove that the limitation period was in fact tolled. Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877, 880-81 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Paine v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying Arkansas law)). The Plaintiffs' burden here is preponderance of the evidence. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 317-18, 843 S.W.2d 842, 844 (1992). In order to toll a limitation period on the basis of fraudulent concealment, there must be: "(1) a positive act of fraud (2) that is actively concealed, and (3) is not discoverable by reasonable diligence." Paine, 594 F.3d at 992 (quotation omitted).
This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant's failure to disclose the Plaintiffs' rights under Arkansas law is the type of "affirmative and fraudulent act of concealment" required to toll statutes of limitations in Arkansas. The "classic language on point" in Arkansas regarding fraud sufficient to toll the statute of limitations is as follows:
No mere ignorance on the part of the plaintiff of his rights, nor the mere silence of one who is under no obligation to speak, will prevent the statute bar. There must be some positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff's cause of action concealed or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself.
First Pyramid, 311 Ark. at 319, 843 S.W.2d at 845 (quoting Wilson v. GECAL, 311 Ark. 84, 841 S.W.2d 619 (1992) (citations omitted)). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that they reasonably and justifiably relied on Defendant's representations that they had received all they were entitled to recover under their policies. They allege that Defendant had a duty to disclose to Plaintiffs that they were entitled to recover the full cost of labor necessary to repair or replace their property. While the Plaintiffs have pled that the Defendant's actions were dishonest, there is no allegation in the Complaint of anything that was so "furtively planned and secretly executed" that would prevent the Plaintiffs from discovering the cause of action within the limitations period because it was "perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself." Therefore, the Plaintiffs fail to show by a preponderance of the evidence that their allegations rise to the level of fraud required to toll the statute of limitations in Arkansas.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to toll the statue of limitations because they fail to allege when and how the fraud was discovered. "Fraud suspends the running of the statute of limitations... until the party having the cause of action discovers the fraud or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence." Martin v. Arthur, 3 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Ark. 1999) (quotation omitted). Part of the Plaintiffs' burden is to show that they could not, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered the alleged unlawful conduct earlier, as well as affirmatively plead when and how the fraud was discovered. See Summerhill, 637 F.3d at 880-81 (citing Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1879) ("If the plaintiff made any particular discovery, it should be stated when it was made, what it was, how it was made, and why it was not made sooner.... The circumstances of the discovery must be fully stated and proved, and the delay which has occurred must be shown to be consistent with the requisite diligence.")).
Plaintiffs' conclusory allegation that "[b]ecause of Defendant's actions, Plaintiffs and other Class Members could not have known they had been underpaid on their claims through the exercise of due diligence" does not reveal why they could not discover the fraud, when it was discovered, or the manner by which it was discovered. There is no demonstration of why the exercise of diligence would not have revealed the fraud within the limitations period. In fact, Plaintiffs allege that it is consistent with "longstanding legal principles that materials are subject to depreciation while labor is not." (ECF No. 3 ¶17). Additionally, by failing to allege when and how they discovered Farmer's alleged fraud, Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that fraudulent concealment would toll the time period sufficiently to save their otherwise time-barred claims. See Summerhill, 637 F.3d at 880-81; 51 Am. ...