Submitted: April 17, 2015.
Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids.
For United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee: Justin A. Lightfoot, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids, IA.
Jamie Goad, Defendant - Appellant, Pro se, Oxford, WI.
For Bradley Ryan Hansen, Assistant Federal Public Defender Federal Public Defender's Office, Sioux City, IA; Jill M. Johnston, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Northern District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids, IA.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
RILEY, Chief Judge.
The second time the district court revoked Jamie Goad's supervised release, it sentenced him to five months in prison and ordered him to reside in a residential reentry center for 120 days after his release from prison. Within two months of his residency at the Gerald R. Hinzman Residential Reentry Center (Hinzman Center), Goad absconded. Goad was soon arrested and indicted for escaping from custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Goad moved to dismiss the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), contending § 751(a) does not criminalize his abscondence because he was not in " custody" while residing at the Hinzman Center. The district court denied his motion. Goad conditionally pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Only that issue is before us.
Goad's appeal raises a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: whether " residency in a residential reentry center as a condition of supervised release constitutes 'custody' under § 751(a)." We review this challenge to the
indictment de novo. See United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining the sufficiency of an indictment is reviewed de novo); see also United States v. Smith, 756 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo). We begin our interpretation, as always, with the statute's text, " 'giv[ing] words their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning'" wherever a statutory definition is absent. Smith, 756 F.3d at 1073 (alteration in original) (quoting Hennepin Cnty. v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 742 F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 2014)). If the text's " meaning is unambiguous when 'read in its proper context,'" as it is here, we look no further. Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 114 L.Ed.2d 194 (1991)).
Section 751(a) condemns those who
escape or attempt to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or magistrate judge, or from the custody of an officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, . . ...