PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NOS. 60CR-11-3885; 60CR-13-851;
60CR-13-933. HONORABLE HERBERT WRIGHT, JR., JUDGE.
PRO SE MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF
AND FOR TRANSCRIPT.
Charles Robinson filed a pro se petition for postconviction
relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which was denied by the circuit court.
Robinson lodged this appeal, and he has filed two motions in
which he seeks an extension of time to file his brief and
also seeks a copy of the trial transcript at public expense.
Because it is clear that Robinson cannot prevail on appeal,
we dismiss the appeal, and Robinson's motions are moot.
December 8, 2014, Robinson pleaded guilty to aggravated
robbery, theft of property obtained by threat of serious
physical injury, and possession of firearms by certain
persons in case number 60CR-11-3885. On the same date,
Robinson also pleaded guilty to an additional charge of
robbery and theft in case number 60CR-13-851 and to
possession of a controlled 60CR-13-933. The sentencing orders
were entered on January 15, 2015.
filed a timely, verified Rule 37 petition on April 13, 2015,
alleging that his convictions were the result of ineffective
assistance of his counsel, Kathryn Hudson, because she failed
to inform him that the prosecutor had made a plea offer that
recommended a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment with 5
years suspended with respect to the offenses charged in case
number 60CR-11-3885. According to Robinson's Rule 37.1
petition, the aforementioned plea offer was withdrawn by the
prosecutor after Robinson was charged with first-degree
murder. The record demonstrates that Robinson was arrested in
2011 on the charges in case number 60CR-11-3885, but was
released on bail. While Robinson was free on bail, he was
charged with the additional offenses reflected in case
numbers 60CR-13-851 and 60CR-13-933. Robinson was also
charged with first-degree murder in case number 60CR-13-780,
for which he was convicted on a later date.
filed a Rule 37.1 petition that listed the case numbers
connected with all the offenses to which he pleaded guilty on
December 8, 2014: 60CR11-3885, 60CR-13-851, and 60CR-13-933.
However, the record reflects that Robinson was represented by
Jessica Duncan in case numbers 60CR-13-851 and 60CR-13-933,
and Robinson did not raise any allegations of deficiency with
regard to Duncan's representation. Robinson's request
for postconviction relief is based solely on allegations that
Hudson's failure to communicate a plea offer allegedly
made in case number 60CR-11-3885 deprived him of a
constitutional right. Robinson further alleged that he was
prejudiced by Hudson's failure because, after he pleaded
guilty on December 8, 2014, the circuit court sentenced him
to 720 months' imprisonment for the crimes, rather
the more lenient 180-month sentence allegedly recommended in
a plea offer that was withdrawn. Robinson also alleged that
Hudson coerced him into pleading guilty. Robinson requested
that he be allowed to withdraw his plea so that he can be
apprised of the first plea offer and allowed the "
opportunity to consider said plea."
circuit court denied the petition without a hearing and
concluded that Robinson raised no allegations with regard to
Duncan's representation in case numbers 60CR-13-851 and
60CR-13-933; that Robinson's allegation of coercion was
contradicted by plea statements executed by him; that
Robinson failed to establish the existence of another plea
offer or the date on which it was made known to Hudson; and
that the allegations and the request for relief set out in
the petition were insufficient to warrant relief under Rule
37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
court will not reverse the circuit court's decision
granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is
clearly erroneous. Adkins v. State, 2015 Ark. 336,
at 1, 469 S.W.3d 790, 794. A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate
court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. Id. When considering an appeal from a
trial court's denial of a postconviction petition based
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the sole
question presented is whether under the standard announced in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the circuit court clearly erred
when it held that counsel was not ineffective. Hooks v.
State, 2015 Ark. 258, at 3-4, 465 S.W.3d 416, 419 (per
curiam). Under the Strickland test, a petitioner
must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and a
petitioner must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance. Pennington v.
State, 2013 Ark. 39, at 1-2 (per curiam). A petitioner
must satisfy both prongs of the test, and it is not necessary
to determine whether counsel was deficient if the petitioner
fails to demonstrate prejudice as to an alleged error.
demonstrate prejudice where a plea offer has lapsed or been
rejected because of counsel's deficient performance, a
petitioner must show a reasonable probability both that the
plea offer would have been accepted had counsel communicated
the offer and that the plea would have been entered without
the prosecution's canceling it or the trial court's
refusal to accept it. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct.
1399, 1402-03, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012). Thus, a petitioner
must demonstrate that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. Id. at 1410. Allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel in the ...