FROM DENIAL OF PRO SE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF; PRO
SE MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION TO REMAND AND MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO.
23CR-12-571. HONORABLE CHARLES E. CLAWSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Larenzo Chatmon appeals the denial of his pro se petition for
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Also pending are
Chatmon's motion and amended motion to remand to the
trial court, as well as his motion for appointment of
counsel. Because it is clear from the record that Chatmon
cannot prevail on appeal, we affirm and his motions are moot.
August 9, 2013, Chatmon was found guilty by a jury of three
counts of aggravated robbery and one count of theft of
property. He was sentenced, as a habitual offender with a
firearm enhancement, to a term of three life sentences plus
360 months' imprisonment. His convictions resulted from
the residential robbery of three individuals at gunpoint. His
convictions and sentences were affirmed by this court on
direct appeal. Chatmon v. State, 2015 Ark. 28, 467
filed a timely petition for postconviction relief. The trial
court conducted a hearing and provided Chatmon with the
opportunity to make additional arguments and allegations in
support of his petition for postconviction relief. Following
the hearing, the trial court denied relief and concluded that
Chatmon's claims were without merit as either not
cognizable in a Rule 37 proceeding or insufficient to meet
the two-prong standard announced in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
court will not reverse the trial court's decision
granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is
clearly erroneous. Adkins v. State, 2015 Ark. 336,
at 1, 469 S.W.3d 790, 794 (per curiam). A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. Id. We will affirm if a trial court makes
the correct decision even if it does so for a different
reason. Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 422, 64 S.W.3d
728, 737 (2002).
first point on appeal, Chatmon alleges that his arrest was
based on unreliable and thus insufficient evidence, an
obstruction of justice, along with the " wholesale
suppression" of exculpatory evidence; and that he is
innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. Generally,
a challenge to the validity of an
arrest warrant and a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence
are not cognizable under Rule 37.1. Moten v. State,
2013 Ark. 503, at 4 (per curiam); Scott v. State,
2012 Ark. 199, at 6-7, 406 S.W.3d 1, 4 (per curiam).
Chatmon's assertion that the police and prosecutor
suppressed exculpatory evidence was not raised below and will
not be addressed on appeal. Thornton v. State, 2014
Ark. 113, at 2 (per curiam) (An appellant cannot raise new
arguments on appeal or add factual substantiation to the
allegations made below.).
second point on appeal, Chatmon alleges improper admission of
prejudicial evidence. Claims of trial error that could have
been addressed at trial and on the record on direct appeal
are not grounds for relief under Rule 37.1. Stewart v.
State, 2014 Ark. 419, at 10, 443 S.W.3d 538, 545 (per
curiam). Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 is not a
means to challenge the admissibility of evidence.
Id. (citing Watson v. State, 2012 Ark. 27,
at 3 (per curiam)).
third assignment of error, Chatmon insists that his right to
a speedy trial was violated and that counsel waived his
speedy-trial rights without his knowledge or consent. We have
consistently held that claims based on a violation of the
right to a speedy trial are a direct attack on the judgment,
and such claims are not grounds for a collateral attack on
the judgment under Rule 37.1. Fletcher v. State,
2015 Ark. 106, at 3, 458 S.W.3d 234, 238 (per curiam).
Chatmon's claim that counsel was ineffective in waiving
his right to a speedy trial without his knowledge or consent