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Carr v. Colvin

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division

May 13, 2016

QUAN CARR PLAINTIFF
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

ORDER

P. K. HOLMES, III CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff, Quan Carr, appealed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to this Court. On October 6, 2015, a Judgment was entered remanding this matter to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 20). Plaintiff now moves for an award of $6, 862.50 in attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter “EAJA”), requesting compensation for 37.5 hours of work performed before the Court in 2014 and 2015, at an hourly rate of $183.00. (Doc. 21-1). Defendant has filed a response, stating that she does not oppose the hourly rate sought, but does object to some of the time entries sought, as non-compensable under the EAJA. (Doc. 23).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the Court must award attorney's fees to a prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further proceedings is a prevailing party.

In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, the Court will in each case consider the following factors: time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of questions involved; the skill required to handle the problems presented; the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; the customary fee; whether the fee is fixed or contingent; time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; the amount involved and the results obtained; the attorney’s experience, reputation and ability; the “undesirability” of the case; the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and awards in similar cases. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983).

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The Court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. Clements v. Astrue, 2009 WL 4508480 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 1, 2009); see also Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.”).

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit “an itemized statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with “contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work.” Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the Court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983).

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at an hourly rate of $183.00 for 2014 and 2015, for a total of 37.5 hours, which she asserts were devoted to the representation of Plaintiff in this Court. The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Attorney fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the Court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when there is “uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney’s fees of more than [the maximum statutory hourly rate], ” such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Plaintiff’s counsel failed to submit a CPI index in support of her requested hourly rate. However, Amended General Order 39 provides that the CPI-South index is to be used in computing cost of living increases. The Court finds that the CPI-South index supports an award based upon an hourly rate of $183.00 for 2014 and 2015.[1] See Johnson, 919 F.2d at 505.

The Court will next address the number of hours Plaintiff’s counsel has alleged she spent in this matter.

I. Administrative Level:

Defendant objects to the following entry, arguing that this was work performed at the administrative level.
3/26/14 Receive denial by Appeals Council .10

Time spent at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). The Court will therefore deduct 0.10 from the attorney hours.

II. Paralegal and Clerical Activities:

Defendant objects to the following entries, arguing they are ...


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