United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS, UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
Phyllis Lee appealed the Commissioner's denial of
benefits to this Court. On January 12, 2016, judgment was
entered remanding Plaintiff's case to the Commissioner
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc.
14). Plaintiff now moves for an award of $4, 116.00 in
attorney's fees and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2412,
the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter
"EAJA"), requesting compensation for 22.35 attorney
hours of work before the Court at an hourly rate of $186.00
for work performed in 2014, $187.00 per hour for work
performed in 2015, and $188.00 per hour for work performed in
2016. (Docs. 16-17). Defendant filed a response to Plaintiffs
application, stating that she does not oppose an award to
Plaintiff in the amount requested. (Doc. 18).
to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the Court must award
attorney's fees to a prevailing social security claimant
unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits
was substantially justified. The burden is on the
Commissioner to show substantial justification for the
government's denial of benefits. Jackson v.
Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). Under
Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a
social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four judgment
reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and
remanding the case for further proceedings is a prevailing
party. After reviewing the file, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter.
determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will
in each case consider the following factors: time and labor
required; the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;
the skill required to handle the problems presented; the
preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
the case; the customary fee; whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; the amount involved and the results obtained;
the attorney's experience, reputation and ability; the
"undesirability" of the case; the nature and length
of the professional relationship with the client; and awards
in similar cases. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 430 (1983).
the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The
Court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee
request, even in the absence of an objection by the
Commissioner. Clements v. Astrue, 2009 WL 4508480
(W.D. Ark. Dec. 1, 2009); see also Decker v.
Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 1992)
("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness
to the parties requires an accurately calculated
attorney's fee award.").
EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit
"an itemized statement . . . stating the actual time
expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were
computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys
seeking fees under federal fee-shifting statutes such as the
EAJA are required to present fee applications with
"contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates
claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of
the work." Id. Where documentation is
inadequate, the Court may reduce the award accordingly.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983).
attorney requests an award under the EAJA for 0.10 hour of
attorney work performed in 2014, at an hourly rate of
$186.00; 20.25 hours of attorney work performed in 2015, at
an hourly rate of $187.00; and 2.00 hours of attorney work
performed in 2016, at an hourly rate of $188.00. The party
seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the
claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
437. Attorney fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00
per hour-the maximum statutory rate under §
2412(d)(2)(A)-unless the court finds that an increase in the
cost of living or a special factor such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
to General Order 39,  which references the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) - South, the Court finds that an enhanced hourly rate
based on a cost of living increase is appropriate, and
counsel will be compensated at $186.00 per hour in 2014,
$187.00 per hour in 2015, and $188.00 per hour in 2016.
Court will next address the number of hours requested by
Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiffs counsel submitted the
following attorney hours:
January 29, 2015
Send request for reassignment...0.10 hour,
May 5, 2015
Prepare summons for each party...0.40 hour, and
June 8, 2015
Submit brief...0.25 hour.
respect to these hours, clerical or secretarial tasks are not
compensable under the EAJA. See Granville House, Inc. v.
Dep't of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1987)
(work which could have been completed by support staff is not
compensable under the EAJA). "[P]urely clerical or
secretarial tasks should not be billed at [even] a paralegal
rate regardless of who performs them." Missouri v.
Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989). There is a
plethora of district court cases reaching different
conclusions as to whether tasks such as those detailed above
are compensable or are considered purely clerical. See
e.g., Peters v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-5198-JRC, 2016 WL
948958 at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2016); Zabawa v.
Colvin, 3:14-CV-3068-MEF, 2016 WL 164625 at *1 (W.D.
Ark. Jan. 13, 2016); Sheridan v. Colvin, No.
JKB-15-10, 2015 WL 5897735 at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2015);
Talmo v. Colvin, No. ELH-14-2214, 2015 WL 5897707 at
*2 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2015); Treadway v. Comm'r. of Soc.
Sec, No. 1-13-cv-01248-SAB, 2014 WL 6901869 at *5-6
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014); Echtinaw v. Astrue, No.
C09-0024-RSL, 2009 WL 6040072 at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 9,
2009); Knudsen v. Bamhart, 360 F.Supp.2d 963, 977
(N.D. Iowa 2004).
a review of the various decisions of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals indicates that all that have addressed the issue,
except the First Circuit, hold that tasks such as the filing
of documents and preparing and serving summons are considered
clerical and not compensable. See Neil v. Comm'r. of
Soc. Sec, 495 Fed.App'x. 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2012);
Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 973
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist, No. 98-20692, 1999 WL 1131554 at *9 (5th Cir. Nov.
8, 1999). The Eighth Circuit does not appear to have
addressed the issue. The First Circuit in Lipsett v.
Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 940 (1st Cir. 1992), held that
tasks such as the filing of documents "ought not to be
billed at lawyers' rates, even if a lawyer performs
them." The Court held that the hours should not be
completely eliminated, however, as the tasks "fell into
the gray area between purely clerical tasks and those
properly entrusted to a paralegal." Id. The
Court concluded that, while the hours should not be
compensated at the extravagant attorney-fee rate, which was
incommensurate to the nature of the tasks, the hours could be
compensated at the prevailing paralegal rate.
undersigned finds the First Circuit's approach persuasive
and a reasonable compromise when it is not clear whether
tasks such as those at issue in this case should be
classified as purely clerical. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
attorney will be compensated for these other tasks at the
prevailing hourly paralegal market rate, which, based on the
paralegal rates submitted by other attorneys in this area, is
upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff is
entitled to an attorney's fee award under the EAJA for:
0.10 attorney hour for work performed in 2014, at hourly rate
of $186.00; 19.50 attorney hours for work performed in 2015,
at an hourly rate of $187.00; 2.00 attorney hours for work
performed in 2016, at an hourly rate of $188.00; and 0.75
paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $75.00, for a total
attorney's fee of $4, 097.35. This amount should be paid
in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which