Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Young v. Colvin

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division

May 23, 2016

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.


          JOE J. VOLPE, Magistrate Judge.

         This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States District Judge J. Leon Holmes. The parties may file specific objections to these findings and recommendations and must provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. The objections must be filed with the Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. A copy must be served on the opposing party. The District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject these proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part.


         Plaintiff, Kim Young, has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social

         Security Administration to deny her claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Both parties have submitted briefs and the case is ready for a decision.

         A court's function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and free of legal error. Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009); Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

         In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, courts must consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it; a court may not, however, reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). After careful review of the pleadings and evidence in this case, I find the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and recommend the Complaint be DISMISSED.

         Plaintiff was fifty-one years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (Tr. 29) She testified she went to the twelfth grade in school. ( Id. )

         Plaintiff alleges she is disabled due to anxiety, depression, and hypertension. (Tr. 43) The ALJ[1] found Ms. Young had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 1, 2012, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 13) She has a "severe" impairment in the form of depression and hypertension. ( Id. ) The ALJ further found Ms. Young did not have an impairment or combination of impairments meeting or equaling an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.[2] (Tr. 14)

         The ALJ determined Ms. Young had the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of light work. (Tr. 15) He determined Ms. Young had no past relevant work, so he utilized the services of a vocational expert to determine whether other work existed in significant numbers that Plaintiff could perform despite her impairments. (Tr. 17-18, 39-41) Through asking hypothetical questions of the vocational expert, the ALJ assessed that Ms. Young could perform the jobs of housekeeper and small products assembler. (Doc. No. 18) Accordingly, the ALJ determined Ms. Young was not disabled. (Tr. 18-19)

         The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a review of the ALJ's decision, making his decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3) Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint initiating this appeal. (Doc. No. 2)

         In support of her Complaint, Plaintiff raises several arguments. She believes the ALJ improperly evaluated the evidence from her treating doctor, did not give enough weight to her to Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores, erred with his credibility analysis, incorrectly determined her residual functional capacity, and asked improper hypothetical questions of the vocational expert. (Doc. No. 9)

         With regard to her first argument, Plaintiff argues that the findings of her treating physician, Dianna Esmaeilpour, M.D., should constitute substantial evidence. Generally, this is true. But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has re-iterated:

Generally, a treating physician's opinion is given more weight than other sources in a disability proceeding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Indeed, when the treating physician's opinion is supported by proper medical testing, and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ must give the opinion controlling weight. Id . "However, [a]n ALJ may discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions." Wildman v. Astrue,596 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir.2010) (alteration in original) ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.