FROM THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 35DR-07-129]
HONORABLE DONALD EUGENE BISHOP, JUDGE
T. Jones, pro se appellant.
Mae Robinson-Jones, pro se appellant.
McKissic & Associates, PLLC, by: Jackie B. Harris, for
appellee Gerald Robinson, Sheriff, Jefferson County,
LARRYD. VAUGHT, Judge
Thomas Jones and Ollye Mae Robinson Jones (the Joneses)
appeal the order entered by the Jefferson County Circuit
Court dismissing, with prejudice, their petition for replevin
filed against appellees Kimberly Miller and Jefferson County
Sheriff Gerald Robinson. The trial court's order found
that the petition was barred by the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel; that the Joneses
lacked standing; and that the petition failed to state a
cause upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the
Joneses contend that the trial court erred in finding that
res judicata and collateral estoppel bar their claim. Because
the Joneses challenge only two of the five independent
grounds supporting the trial court's order, we summarily
and Kimberly were divorced by decree in October 2007. In
March 2008, the trial court entered a supplemental decree and
final order that, among other things, awarded Kimberly a $20,
687.75 judgment against Thomas. After the sale of real
property contemplated in the supplemental decree, the
judgment was reduced to $20, 187.75. The Jefferson County
Circuit Clerk issued a writ of execution on October 27, 2011,
directing Sheriff Robinson to take possession of four
vehicles owned by Thomas.
November 2011, Ollye Mae filed a motion to intervene, claiming
that she had an ownership interest in three of the vehicles
subject to the writ of execution. The court suspended the
enforcement of the writ, and two hearings were held on her
motion to intervene. Thereafter, in April 2013, the trial
court entered an order denying Ollye Mae's motion to
intervene with respect to one of the vehicles; lifting the
stay of the writ of execution; ordering the sheriff to
proceed with seizing the four vehicles; and enjoining each
party from disposing of or removing from the court's
jurisdiction any of the vehicles. Ollye Mae timely appealed
from this order to our court, arguing that she was the owner
of the vehicles, that her property had been taken without
adequate compensation, and that Kimberly had become unjustly
enriched. Robinson v. Miller, 2014 Ark.App. 144. Due
to briefing deficiencies in the abstract and addendum, we
ordered rebriefing, warning Ollye Mae that the failure to
file a compliant brief may result in affirmance. Id.
Mae refiled her brief with our court; however, she made
minimal changes and failed to correct all the examples of
deficiencies. As such, in an opinion dated October 8, 2014,
we affirmed the trial court's order based on
noncompliance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2. Robinson v.
Miller, 2014 Ark.App. 539, at 2. We denied Ollye
Mae's petition for rehearing on November 19, 2014.
March 25, 2015, Ollye Mae and Thomas filed a petition for
replevin seeking possession of the four vehicles. They
contend that the judgment Thomas owed Kimberly was satisfied
by the conveyance of real property to her; therefore, the
four vehicles had been wrongfully taken from them. On July
31, 2015, the trial court entered an order dismissing, with
prejudice, the Joneses' replevin petition. The trial
court's order found that the petition was barred by the
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel; that the Joneses lacked standing; and
that the petition failed to state a cause upon which relief
can be granted. The Joneses timely appealed from the order
dismissing their replevin petition with prejudice.
appeal, the Joneses address only two of the five grounds
given by the trial court in reaching its decision to dismiss
the petition for replevin. They challenge the trial
court's findings that res judicata and collateral
estoppel bar their claim, but they do not challenge the trial
court's findings that the law of the case, the lack of
standing, and the failure to state a claim also bar their
claim. Where the trial court bases its decision on two or
more independent grounds and appellant challenges fewer than
all of the grounds, the appellate court will affirm without
addressing either. Coleman v. Regions Bank, 364 Ark.
59, 64, 216 S.W.3d 569, 573 (2005) (citing Pugh v.
State, 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002); Pearrow v.
Feagin, 300 Ark. 274, 778 S.W.2d 941 (1989)).
Consequently, the Joneses' arguments cannot be examined
because they did not challenge the other three independent
grounds that the trial court relied on in making its decision
to dismiss their petition for replevin. Accordingly, we
and Hoofman, JJ., agree.