Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Tanner v. Colvin

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fort Smith Division

June 23, 2016

BOBBY W. TANNER, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

          Bobby W. Tanner, Plaintiff, represented by Davis Duty, Duty and Duty Attorney's at Law.

          Social Security Administration Commissioner, Defendant, represented by Adrial B. McField, Social Security Administration.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          BARRY A. BRYANT, Magistrate Judge.

         Bobby W. Tanner ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act ("The Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), and a period of disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act.

         Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2009), the Honorable P. K. Holmes, III referred this case to this Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation. In accordance with that referral, and after reviewing the arguments of counsel, this Court recommends Plaintiff's case be REVERSED AND REMANDED.

         1. Background:

         Plaintiff protectively filed his disability applications on January 13, 2010. (Tr. 115-122).[1] In his applications, Plaintiff alleged he was disabled due to due to diabetic insulin dependence and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 157). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of January 1, 2009. (157, 367).

         On June 8, 2011, Plaintiff had an administrative hearing. (Tr. 29-55). On June 20, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 13-24). Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 7-9). The Appeals Council denied his request for review on October 2, 2012. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff filed an appeal to the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas and the District Court remanded this case to the Commissioner for further consideration on February 6, 2014. (Tr. 435). On May 8, 2014, the Appeals Council remanded this case to the ALJ for further proceedings. (Tr. 446).

         Thereafter, on February 3, 2015, Plaintiff had a second administrative hearing. (Tr. 388-409). Plaintiff was present at this hearing and was represented by attorney Davis Duty Id. Plaintiff, and Vocational Expert ("VE") Montie Lumpkin testified at this hearing. Id.

         On May 4, 2015, the ALJ entered a partially favorable decision finding Plaintiff disabled beginning on August 1, 2014, but not disabled from his alleged onset date of January 1, 2009 through July 31, 2014. (Tr. 367-381). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2010. (Tr. 369, Finding 1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity ("SGA") since his alleged onset date. (Tr. 369, Finding 2).

         The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: adjustment disorder with depression and anxiety, borderline intellectual functioning, and insulin dependent diabetes mellitus. (Tr. 369, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the Listings in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). (Tr. 370, Finding 4).

         The ALJ then evaluated the credibility of Plaintiff's subjective complaints and determined his Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"). (Tr. 372, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and found they were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ found prior to August 1, 2014, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967, except is able to perform work that is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks involving simple, work-related decisions, with few, if any, workplace changes and no more than incidental contact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. Id.

         The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work ("PRW"). (Tr. 378, Finding 7). The ALJ determined since January 1, 2009 Plaintiff's was unable to perform his PRW. Id. Upon consideration of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and the VE's testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff would be able to perform other work such as a power screwdriver operator and filling and closing tender prior to August 1, 2014. (Tr. 379, Finding 11). Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, prior to August 1, 2014, but became disabled on that date and continued to be disabled through the date of the decision. (Tr. 380, Finding 12).

         On September 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 10, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.