United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fort Smith Division
BARRY A. BRYANT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Lowe (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to
§ 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act
(“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006),
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) denying her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the
Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this
case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a
final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings.
ECF No. 5. Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a
final judgment in this matter.
application for DIB was filed on March 15, 2012. (Tr. 11,
127). Plaintiff alleged she was disabled due to fibromyalgia,
bulging disc, and depression. (Tr. 61). Plaintiff alleged an
onset date of August 14, 2011. (Tr. 11). This application was
denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on
her application and this hearing request was granted. (Tr.
had an administrative hearing on May 1, 2013. (Tr. 29-56).
Plaintiff was present and was represented by non-attorney
representative, Phillip Roddy, at this hearing. Id.
Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Debra
Steele testified at this hearing. Id. At the time of
this hearing, Plaintiff was forty-nine (49) years old and had
a high school education. (Tr. 34, 37).
March 19, 2014, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision
denying Plaintiff’s application for DIB. (Tr. 11-21).
In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the
insured status requirements of the Act through December 31,
2016. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff
had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity
(“SGA”) since August 14, 2011, her alleged onset
date. (Tr. 13, Finding 2).
determined Plaintiff had the severe impairments of
degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and depression. (Tr.
13, Finding 3). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements
of any of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart
P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 14,
decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints and determined her RFC. (Tr. 16-20). First, the
ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints and found her claimed limitations were not
entirely credible. Id. The ALJ also found Plaintiff
retained the RFC to perform light work activity without
overhead reaching; no more than occasional climbing of ramps,
stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; no more than
occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and
crawling; work limited to simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks involving only simple, work-related decisions with few,
if any, workplace changes; and no more than incidental
contact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public.
(Tr. 16, Finding 5).
evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”). (Tr. 20, Finding 6). The ALJ found
Plaintiff was capable of performing her PRW as a gasket
attacher and peanut sorter. Id. Based upon this
finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a
disability as defined by the Act from August 14, 2011 through
the date of the decision. (Tr. 21, Finding 7).
August 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No.
1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on
August 20, 2015. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have filed appeal
briefs. ECF Nos. 11, 12. This case is now ready for decision.
reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine
whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart,
292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is
less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel,
240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is
substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it
simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that
would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court
would have decided the case differently. See Haley v.
Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after
reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions
represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ
must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
well established that a claimant for Social Security
disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her
disability by establishing a physical or mental disability
that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her
from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See
Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act
defines a “physical or mental impairment” as
“an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her
disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C.
determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a
disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step
sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the
claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful
activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s
physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or
equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the
regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard
to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the
claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to
perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the
claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the
national economy that the claimant can perform. See
Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. ...