United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Harrison Division
OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a civil rights action filed by the Plaintiff, Victor Levi
Long, under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Long
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. He
is currently incarcerated in the Randall L. Williams
Correctional Facility of the Arkansas Department of
Correction. At the times relevant to this Complaint, the
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Carroll County Detention
Defendant, Sheriff Danny Hickman, has filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 13). Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion.
26, 2015, when he was in line to get his breakfast tray, Long
stepped forward into some spilled juice causing him to fall
to the floor. Plaintiff alleges the officers were standing
approximately a foot away on the opposite side of the spill
and, knowing about the spill, allowed him step forward into
it. Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Hickman failed to provide him
with a safe environment. Because of the fall, Plaintiff
alleges he has a torn anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) in his
8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a
complaint to present "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "In order to meet this standard,
and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 'a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the
pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a
'sheer possibility.'" Braden, 588 F.3d
at 594 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The
standard does "not impose a probability requirement at
the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise
a reasonable expectation, " or reasonable inference,
that the "defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (While
pro se complaints are liberally construed, they must allege
sufficient facts to support the claims.).
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but
neither does it permit inhumane ones. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids conditions
that involve the "wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain, " or are "grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must prove
both an objective and subjective element. Revels v.
Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). "The
defendant's conduct must objectively rise to the level of
a constitutional violation by depriving the plaintiff of the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. The
defendant's conduct must also reflect a subjective state
of mind evincing deliberate indifference to the health or
safety of the prisoner." Revels, 382 F.3d at
875 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Deliberate indifference is established when the plaintiff
shows "the defendant was substantially aware of but
disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety." Revels, 382 F.3d at 875.
there is no allegation that spilled juice was an ongoing
problem or that any person had fallen in the same area before
Plaintiff fell. In short, there is simply nothing to suggest
the Defendant failed to act in the face of a risk of harm to
the health or safety of the detainees at the CCDC. See
e.g., LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.
1993) ("slippery prison floors... do not state even an
arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishments")
Plaintiff has not alleged that Sheriff Hickman was present,
was aware of the spilled juice, knew juice was frequently
spilled in this area, or in some way was personally involved
in the alleged constitutional violation. To establish
personal liability of a supervisory defendant, a plaintiff
must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or
direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his
constitutional rights. Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477
F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v.
Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). No
plausible claim is alleged against Sheriff Hickman.