United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Jonesboro Division
LEON HOLMES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Kevin Sanders, an inmate at the Mississippi County Detention
Center, filed this lawsuit pro se, and submitted an
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). Documents #1, #2, #6. Because Sanders has provided the
necessary documentation, his motion to proceed IFP is
In Forma Pauperis Application
though Sanders may proceed IFP, the law requires him to pay a
$350.00 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The only
question is the amount of the monthly payments Sanders must
make from his prison trust account to satisfy the filing fee.
Here, based on the information contained in the trust fund
calculation sheet and certificate, the Court will assess an
initial partial filing fee of $15.76.
present custodians are directed to collect from
Sanders’ institutional account an initial partial
filing fee of $30.41, and to forward that amount to the Clerk
of this Court. Thereafter, Sanders’ custodians are
directed to collect monthly payments amounting to 20% of the
preceding month’s income credited to Sanders’
prison trust account each time the amount in the account
exceeds $10.00, until the $350.00 filing fee is paid in full.
Payments should be clearly identified by the name and number
assigned to this action.
Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to
the Sheriff of the Mississippi County Detention Center, 685
NCR 599, Luxora, Arkansas 72358.
docketing, or as soon thereafter as practicable, a
prisoner’s complaint must be reviewed to identify
cognizable claims and must be dismissed if it: (1) is
frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Although a complaint requires only a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, the factual allegations set
forth therein must be sufficient to raise the right to relief
above the speculative level. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (“a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]
to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do . . . .”). A pro se
complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable.
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985). However, a pro se plaintiff’s
allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North
Dakota Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043,
1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
to Sanders’ complaint, he is being held at the
Mississippi County Detention Center without cause. He claims
he was arrested for a sexual assault crime that he did not
commit. Document #2. He is awaiting trial.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45, 91 S.Ct. 746,
750-51, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
federal courts should abstain from interfering in ongoing
state proceedings. The Court explained the rationale for such
abstention as follows:
[The concept of federalism] represent[s] . . . a system in
which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750-51.
a federal court must abstain from entertaining constitutional
claims when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; (2) the state proceeding implicates important
state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in
the state proceedings to raise the constitutional challenges.
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 602 (8th
Cir. 1999); Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Riney, 21 F.3d
793, 797 (8th Cir. 1994). If all three questions are answered
affirmatively, a federal court should abstain unless it
detects “bad faith, harassment, or some other
extraordinary circumstance that would make ...