JOHN RANSOM d/b/a RED OAK AUTO CLINIC and DEMETRIUS ANDRE RANSOM APPELLANTS
JMC LEASING SPECIALTIES, LLC APPELLEE
FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND DIVISION [NO.
60CV-15-1411] HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER CHARLES PIAZZA, JUDGE
IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
Ransom and Demetrius Andre' Ransom, pro se appellants.
R. Crabtree, for appellee.
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Ransom d/b/a Red Oak Auto Clinic, and his son and assignee,
Demetrius Ransom, file this pro se appeal from a judgment
declaring their lien on a 2006 Toyota Camry inferior to a
lien held by appellee JMC Leasing Specialties, LLC
("JMC"). They also appeal from an order in which
the court held John in contempt and denied their motion to
vacate the judgment. We affirm the contempt citation and
dismiss the remainder of the appeal.
leased the Camry to Joseph Johnson in September 2013 for a
period of three years. Mr. Johnson defaulted on the lease in
November 2014, after which JMC was unable to locate him.
Around this time, John Ransom came into possession of the
vehicle. It is not clear from the record how he did so, but,
according to him, he towed the vehicle to his auto shop in
January 2015, performed repairs on it, and stored it.
February 2015, John sent JMC a notice advising that the
vehicle would be sold on April 9, 2015, if his lien for
towing, storage, and repairs was not paid. JMC did not pay
the lien but instead sued John, asserting that it had a
perfected automobile-vendors' lien on the Camry and was
entitled to an order delivering the vehicle to its
possession. John responded, inter alia, that his lien was
superior to JMC's and that JMC owed him $3, 661 for
repairs, towing, storage, and administrative costs. Demetrius
was permitted to intervene in the case as John's
assignee. At some point, John's business, Red Oak Auto
Clinic, obtained a certificate of title on the Camry, based
on its being an abandoned vehicle.
trial was held, and the court ruled that JMC had a superior
lien on the Camry. The June 4, 2015 judgment directed both
John and Demetrius Ransom to surrender possession of the
vehicle to JMC and to "immediately" deliver the
vehicle's certificate of title to JMC. The Ransoms
delivered the Camry to JMC shortly after the entry of
judgment but did not deliver the title at that time.
18, 2015, the Ransoms filed a motion to vacate the judgment
and for a new trial. JMC responded with a motion for
contempt, claiming that the Ransoms had not yet forwarded the
Camry title. The court held a hearing on July 23, 2015, that
addressed the Ransoms' posttrial motion and JMC's
contempt petition. In an order entered August 11, 2015, the
court denied the Ransoms' motion to vacate and for a new
trial, held John in contempt, and ordered him to pay $555 to
JMC for its costs and fees occasioned by the delay in
forwarding the certificate of title.
September 10, 2015, the Ransoms filed a notice of appeal from
the June 4, 2015 judgment and the August 11, 2015 order.
Ransoms argue first that the circuit court erred in its
lien-priority ruling. We cannot reach this argument because
the Ransoms did not file a timely notice of appeal from the
June 4, 2015 order or the denial of their posttrial motion.
notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days from the
entry of the judgment, decree, or order appealed
from. This deadline may be extended if a motion
for a new trial or any other motion to vacate, alter, or
amend the judgment is filed no later than ten days after the
judgment. When that occurs, the following timetable
governs the filing of a notice of appeal:
The notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days
from entry of the order disposing of the last motion
outstanding. However, if the circuit court neither grants nor
denies the motion within thirty (30) days of its filing, the
motion shall be deemed denied by operation of law as of the
thirtieth day, and the notice of appeal shall be filed within
thirty (30) days from that date.
case, the Ransoms filed their motion to vacate and for a new
trial on June 18, 2015-ten business days after the June 4,
2015 order. The circuit court did not rule on the
motion within thirty days, and the motion was therefore
deemed denied on Monday, July 20, 2015. Under the terms of
Rule 4(b)(1), quoted above, the Ransoms' notice of appeal
was then due thirty days later, on August 19, 2015. However,
the Ransoms did not file their notice of appeal until
September 10, 2015. Their notice was therefore untimely as to
the June 4, 2015 judgment and the denial of their ...