United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Harrison Division
JEFFERSON D. QUICK, PLAINTIFF
CAROLYN W. COLVIN Commissioner, Social Security Administration, DEFENDANT
BARRY A. BRYANT, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
D. Quick (“Plaintiff”) brings this action
pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security
Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010),
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) denying his applications for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”), and a period of disability under
Titles II and XVI of the Act.
Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case,
including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final
judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF
No. 6. Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a
final judgment in this matter.
protectively filed his disability applications on June 6,
2012. (Tr. 19, 153-165). In his applications, Plaintiff
alleges being disabled due to diabetes, neuropathy,
depression, and hypertension. (Tr. 192). During his
administrative hearing, Plaintiff also alleged being disabled
due to back pain. (Tr. 46). His attorney characterized his
back pain as follows: “He's got a lot of chronic
back pain associated with the heavy works that he has done in
the past.” Id. Plaintiff alleges an onset date
of January 10, 2008. (Tr. 19, 153). These applications were
denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 83-86).
Plaintiff's applications were denied, Plaintiff requested
an administrative hearing on his applications, and this
hearing request was granted. (Tr. 41-82). Thereafter, on
November 14, 2013, the ALJ held an administrative hearing on
Plaintiff's applications. Id. At this hearing,
Plaintiff was present and was represented by Fredrick
Spencer. Id. Plaintiff, two witnesses for Plaintiff,
and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Jim Spragins
testified at this hearing. Id.
30, 2014, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a
fully unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff's
applications. (Tr. 16-34). The ALJ found Plaintiff last met
the insured status requirements of the Act through June 30,
2012. (Tr. 21, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had
not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity
(“SGA”) since January 10, 2008, his alleged onset
date. (Tr. 21, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: depressive disorder (not
otherwise specified); math disorder; generalized anxiety
disorder; personality disorder; and diabetes mellitus with
neuropathy. (Tr. 21-22, Finding 3). The ALJ also determined
Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal
the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in
Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4
(“Listings”). (Tr. 22-23, Finding 4).
found Plaintiff was forty-one (41) years old, which is
defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.963(c) (2008) (SSI) and 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(c) (2008) (DIB). (Tr. 33, Finding 7). As for his
education, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had at least a high
school education and was able to communicate in English. (Tr.
33, Finding 8).
then considered Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”). (Tr. 23-33, Finding 5). First, the ALJ
evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and found his
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id.
Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to
perform the following:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant is able
to perform work that is limited to simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks, involving only simple, work-related
decisions, with few, if any, workplace changes and no more
than incidental contact with coworkers, supervisors and the
then evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”). (Tr. 33, Finding 6). Considering his
RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform any of
his PRW. Id. The ALJ also considered whether
Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr.
33-34, Finding 10). The VE testified at the administrative
hearing regarding this issue. Id. Based upon that
testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity
to perform the following two occupations: (1) small
production machine operator (sedentary, unskilled) with 4,
000 such jobs in Arkansas and 500, 000 such jobs in the
nation; and (2) small product assembler (sedentary,
unskilled) with 4, 000 such jobs in Arkansas and 203, 000
such jobs in the nation. Id. Because Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform this work, the ALJ also
determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as
defined by the Act, from January 10, 2008 through the date of
his decision or through May 30, 2014. (Tr. 34, Finding 11).
Plaintiff requested the review of the Appeals Council. (Tr.
14). On August 14, 2015, the Appeals Council denied this
request for review. (Tr. 1-4). On October 13, 2015, Plaintiff
filed his Complaint in this matter. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on October 15,
2015. ECF No. 6. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF
Nos. 10-11. This case is now ready for decision.