FROM THE SHARP COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. PR-11-119] HONORABLE
PHILIP SMITH, JUDGE
J. Steele PLC, by: Larry J. Steele, for appellant.
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Clarry Foster brings this appeal from an order of the probate
division of the Sharp County Circuit Court dismissing her
claims on the basis of laches. We previously ordered that the
record be settled and supplemented and that a supplemental
abstract, brief, and addendum be filed. Foster v. Estate
of Collins, 2016 Ark.App. 302 (Foster I).
Foster has satisfactorily addressed the deficiencies
specified in that opinion. We therefore turn to the merits of
her argument, and we affirm.
forth the factual and procedural history of this case in
detail in our previous opinion, and we need not do so again
here. In brief, however, Foster was injured in an automobile
accident in 1957; at that time, her father was appointed her
guardian and entered into a settlement on her behalf. Foster
alleged that her father used the proceeds of that settlement
to pay off the family farm, and when the farm was sold some
years later, those proceeds were used to fund two
certificates of deposit (CDs) that were placed in the name of
Foster's mother, Deleta Collins.
alleged in her later-filed complaint that, after her father
died in 1990, her siblings, including appellees Alphaleda
Vaughn and Larry Collins, obtained the CDs by fraud, duress,
undue influence, and breach of fiduciary duty. Contending
that the CDs had been funded by the proceeds of her 1957
settlement, Foster requested that the circuit court impose a
constructive trust by operation of law. After numerous
proceedings, the circuit court eventually dismissed
Foster's action on the basis of laches, reasoning that
any claim arising from the alleged misappropriation of funds
in the 1950s was barred.
appeal, Foster argues that the circuit court's dismissal
of her claims on the grounds of laches was in error. The
issue of laches is one of fact. Royal Oaks Vista, L.L.C.
v. Maddox, 372 Ark. 119, 124, 271 S.W.3d 479, 483
(2008). A reviewing court does not reverse the circuit
court's decision on a question of fact unless it is
clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ark. R. Civ. P.
affirm the circuit court's decision. Foster's brief
is lengthy and somewhat confusing. She begins by reciting the
facts of the case and its procedural background, and she
addresses the deficiencies that we pointed out in Foster
I, explaining why certain matters were omitted from the
record and addendum. She then summarizes the deposition
testimony that was introduced in this case as well as the
arguments that were made before the circuit court.
next provides us with a section entitled "Law."
Here, she begins with a citation to the statutory rule
against perpetuities. Foster suggests that her "interest
was created in 1957 with the trust created from her
settlement proceeds from her accident." Aside from
citing the statute, however, she makes no compelling argument
as to how this statute compels reversal; moreover, the
circuit court's order did not rule on her
rule-against-perpetuities argument. The issue is therefore
not preserved for our review. See Black v. Duffie,
2016 Ark.App. 584, at 33 (noting that, in order to preserve
an issue for appellate review, an appellant is obligated to
obtain a specific ruling on it from the circuit court).
Foster cites two cases for the proposition that the doctrine
of laches is applicable only where equitable relief is sought
and that it is "not applicable to actions for . . . the
recovery of money or property fraudulently obtained."
Warford v. Union Bank of Benton, 2010 Ark.App. 635,
at 5, 378 S.W.3d 239, 243; see also Anadarko Petroleum v.
Venable, 312 Ark. 330, 850 S.W.2d 302 (1993). She does
not go on to analyze how these cases are applicable to her
situation. That failure, however, is immaterial, because
Foster never raised this specific argument below. It is
therefore not preserved for appellate review. See Young
v. Welch, 2016 Ark.App. 614, at 3.
then provides a series of numbered sections titled (1)
"Principal and Agent-Power of Attorney-Fiduciary Duty,
" (2) "Constructive Trust, " (3) "Unjust
Enrichment, " (4) "Confidential Relation, "
and (5) "Undue Influence." These sections consist
of block quotes from caselaw. She concludes this portion of
her brief with conclusory statements that her siblings owed a
fiduciary relationship to their mother, that her father
committed fraud when he converted her settlement in the late
1950s, and that her siblings committed fraud when they
converted Collins's CDs. Foster makes no cogent legal
argument as to why any of these allegations should cause us
to conclude that the circuit court's findings regarding
laches were erroneous. It is a well-settled principle of
appellate law that we will not make a party's argument
for him or her. Running M Farms, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 308, 316, 265 S.W.3d 740, 745
(2007); Kinchen v. Wilkins, 367 Ark. 71, 238 S.W.3d
94 (2006); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v.
Schroder, 353 Ark. 885, 122 S.W.3d 10 (2003).
Foster concludes with two short paragraphs with no citation
to authority. She suggests that "if this court denies
[her] claim for an implied or constructive trust, [she]
claims the CDs in the amount of $62, 000 belong to the estate
of Deleta Collins, " and "Alphaleda Vaughn, as
administrator or personal representative, has a duty to
account for the assets of the decedent while she, Vaughn,
held a fiduciary position with her, including the rent for
the mobile home she charged [Collins] for 20 years which was
purchased with [Collins's] money." This court
"generally decline[s] to consider points that are
incomprehensible and lacking in convincing authority or
argument. Watkins v. Paragould Light & Water
Comm'n, 2016 Ark.App. 432, ...