United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division
Kristine G. Baker United States District Judge
the Court are numerous pending motions filed by plaintiff
Teresa Bloodman (Dkt. Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14,
15, 20). This case was removed from the Circuit Court of
Saline County, Arkansas, by Ms. Bloodman on February 24, 2017
(Dkt. No. 2). For the following reasons, this case is
remanded to the Circuit Court of Saline County, Arkansas, and
all pending motions are denied as moot.
America filed a complaint for reformation and foreclosure
against Ms. Bloodman in Saline County Circuit Court on July
15, 2014. See Bank of America N.A. v. Teresa Bloodman, et
al., No. 63CV-14-415. The state court entered a Decree
of Foreclosure on December 23, 2014, and closed the case on
December 29, 2014. On January 12, 2015, Ms. Bloodman filed a
motion to set aside judgment, which was denied by order dated
March 13, 2015. Ms. Bloodman appealed the order. On February
3, 2016, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's order and judgment. Bloodman v. Bank of
America, N.A., No. CV-15-343 (Ark. App. Feb. 3, 2016).
The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
Commissioner's Sale Notice was filed on July 21, 2016, in
the Saline County Circuit Court case. See Case No.
63-CV-14-415-2. Ms. Bloodman filed a second motion to set
aside judgment on September 19, 2016. The property was sold,
and a Commissioner's Deed was provided to Bank of America
on September 20, 2016. A few weeks later, Ms. Bloodman filed
another motion to set aside judgment in the Saline County
Circuit Court case that is still pending. See Case
January 24, 2017, Bank of America received a Writ of
Assistance allowing it to remove Ms. Bloodman from the
property it purchased on September 20, 2016. In response, Ms.
Bloodman filed numerous motions in February 2017, and then
she removed the case to this Court on February 27, 2017 (Dkt.
Bloodman states that “[r]emoval is based on federal
question jurisdiction because a federal question appears on
the face of the initial pleading filed by Plaintiff Bank of
America, N.A. (BANA).” (Dkt. No. 2, ¶ 2). Even if
this was an accurate statement regarding the initial
pleading- and the Court does not believe that it is-then Ms.
Bloodman's removal is untimely. The federal removal
statute requires a defendant to file a notice of removal
within 30 days after receipt of the initial state court
pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Ms. Bloodman removed
this case years after it was first filed in state court.
alternative basis for her removal of this action, Ms.
Bloodman asserts that “[d]efendant here/Plaintiff in
state court action filed a writ of assistance in the state
action. This case became removable on February 8, 2017,
because of a writ of assistance filed by defendant
here/plaintiff in state action.” (Dkt. No. 2, ¶
4). It is correct that, if a case was not removable based on
the face of the initial pleading, it may be removed within 30
days after receipt of the “amended pleading, motion,
order, or other paper” that made the case removable. 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). However, nothing about the
Writ of Assistance to which Ms. Bloodman cites changed the
fact that this is a case premised on state court forclosure
proceedings. Ms. Bloodman has provided no citations to
authority stating the contrary. To the extent that Ms.
Bloodman is contending that her Due Process claims arose once
the Writ of Assistance was issued, that argument is addressed
under the Rooker-Feldman analysis below.
Ms. Bloodman contends that her “constitutionally
protected procedural due process rights were vitiated as a
commissioner's sale was conducted on the subject property
without her being afforded procedural due process.”
(Dkt. No. 2, ¶ 5). As discussed in the background
section of this Order, this case has been on-going for years
in state court. In fact, the Arkansas Court of Appeals
rejected the same arguments that Ms. Bloodman is now making
in an effort to justify her removal of this action.
Rooker-Feldman, federal courts, other than the
United States Supreme Court, do not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear challenges to state court judgments.
See Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492
(8th Cir. 2000). If a “federal claim succeeds only to
the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue
before it, ” the claim may not be heard by the federal
court. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
A federal district court has jurisdiction over general
constitutional challenges if these claims are not
inextricably intertwined with the claims asserted in state
court. A claim is inextricably intertwined if the federal
claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issues before it. In other words,
Rooker- Feldman precludes a federal action
if the relief requested in the federal action would
effectively reverse the state court decision or void its
Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983
(8th Cir. 1995).
Ms. Bloodman's claims arise out of the state court
foreclosure proceeding. To grant the relief Ms. Bloodman
seeks would effectively amount to a reversal of the state
court's decision regarding the foreclosure. Ms.
Bloodman's removal and alleged Due Process claims are
“essentially a collateral attack in federal district
court on a state foreclosure ...