United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, El Dorado Division
VICKIE BELL; PHILLIP B. BELL, JR.; and JONATHAN BELL PLAINTIFFS
MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES; RUEMELIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.; PULMOSAN SAFETY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION; CLEMCO INDUSTRIES, INC.; and JOHN DOES 1-7 DEFENDANTS
O. Hickey United States District Judge.
the Court is Separate Defendant Pulmosan Safety Equipment
Corporation's (“Pulmosan”) Motion to Quash
Plaintiffs' Post-Judgment Written Discovery. (ECF No.
222). Plaintiffs have filed a response to the motion. (ECF
No. 224). The Court finds this matter ripe for consideration.
requests that the Court quash Plaintiffs' post-judgment
discovery requests. Pulmosan maintains that it has been
dissolved for more than 30 years and has no officer, director
or employee for counsel to consult with in order to respond
to the requested discovery. In addition, Pulmosan argues that
in April 2006 it provided written answers to discovery in an
unrelated case. Pulmosan contends that its answers covered
many of the same subjects, such as Pulmosan's insurance,
finances and matters relating to its dissolution. As a
result, Pulmosan asserts that its prior discovery responses
cover many of the subjects covered in Plaintiffs' current
Rule 7.2(g) provides that “[a]ll motions to compel
discovery and all other discovery enforcement motions and all
motions for protective orders shall contain a statement by
the moving party that the parties have conferred in good
faith on the specific issue or issues in dispute and that
they are not able to resolve their disagreements without the
intervention of the Court.” Local Rule 7.2(g) further
provides that “[i]f any such motion lacks such a
statement, that motion may be dismissed summarily for failure
to comply with this rule.” See also Pennington v.
Univ. of Ark, No. 4:10-CV-1071-DPM, 2011 WL 3418395, at
*1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 4, 2011); Hit Servs., L.P. v. Caddo
Energy Co., No. 6:07-CV-6008, 2009 WL 185590, at *1-2
(W.D. Ark. Jan. 23, 2009)
present case, Pulmosan's motion lacks a statement
indicating that the parties have met and conferred in good
faith regarding Plaintiffs' post-judgment discovery
requests. Instead, Pulmosan merely directs the Court's
attention to the post-judgment discovery requests, served by
Plaintiffs on January 18, 2017, as well as discovery requests
made in the above-mentioned unrelated case. As a result, the
Court is unable to determine whether Pulmosan complied with
Local Rule 7.2(g) prior to filing its motion. Accordingly,
Pulmosan's Motion to Quash Plaintiffs' Post-Judgment
Written Discovery is DENIED. The parties are
directed to comply with Local Rule 7.2(g) and meet and confer
prior to filing any further motions to compel discovery,
discovery-enforcement motions, and motions for protective
alternatively requests that the Court stay all post-judgment
discovery during the pendency of the appeal of the
Court's default judgment order entered on August 26,
2016. (ECF No. 208). In response, Plaintiffs
assert that Pulmosan's request to stay post-judgment
discovery is improper because Pulmosan has failed to post a
supersedeas bond in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 62(d). Rule 62(d) states:
If an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay by
supersedeas bond, except in an action described in Rule
62(a)(1) or (2). The bond may be given upon or after filing
the notice of appeal or after obtaining the order allowing
the appeal. The stay takes effect when the court approves the
Civ. P. 62(d). “The purpose of [Rule 62(d)] is to
ensure that the prevailing party will recover in full, if the
decision should be affirmed, while protecting the other side
against the risk that payment cannot be recouped if the
decision should be reversed.” In re Nassau Cty.
Strip Search Cases, 783 F.3d 414, 417 (2d Cir.
2015) (internal citation omitted). “Although it appears
from the language of Rule 62(d) that a supersedeas bond is a
necessary step to obtain a stay, several appellate and
trial courts have adopted the view that the district court
has the discretion to waive the bond requirement and stay the
enforcement of the judgment pending appeal without a
bond.” Corp. Comm'n of Mille Lacs Band of
Ojibwe Indians v. Money Centers of Am., Inc., No.
12-1015, 2013 WL 6630905, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2013)
(internal citation omitted). “The burden is on the
appellant to persuade the Court to depart from the usual
requirement of a full supersedeas bond.” Id.
present case, Pulmosan has failed to offer any evidence in
support of its assertion that it is without assets. As a
result, the Court is unable to determine whether a complete
waiver of the bond requirement is warranted in this matter.
Pulmosan has also failed to post a bond or offer an
alternative form of security. S.E.C. v. O'Hagan,
901 F.Supp. 1476, 1480 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that an
indigent defendant's motion to stay the execution of a
civil judgment pending appeal was improper because defendant
failed to post a supersedeas bond or alternative security).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Pulmosan's motion to
stay post-judgment discovery is DENIED.
IS SO ORDERED.
 Pulmosan's motion fails to
identify which rule its motion proceeds under. As a result,
the Court assumes Pulmosan moves for a stay of proceedings to
enforce a judgment pursuant to ...