United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Pine Bluff Division
Kristine G. Baker United States District Judge
Court has reviewed the Proposed Findings and Recommendations
(“Recommendations”) filed by United States
Magistrate Jerome T. Kearney (Dkt. Nos. 80, 89). Plaintiff
James McAlphin has filed an objection to the first
Recommendation, and defendants have filed an objection to the
second Recommendation (Dkt. Nos. 84, 93).
issue in the first Recommendation (Dkt. No. 80) is Mr.
McAlphin's claim in his motions for injunctive relief
alleging that co-workers of defendants Campbell and Cornes
are withholding his mail, that staff have refused to process
his parole plan after he made parole in March 2016, and that
he has been issued a “bogus” disciplinary charge
which resulted in his reduction in class (Dkt. Nos. 74, 76).
He also claims that he suffered a heart attack on August 16,
2016, and that medical personnel told him they would let him
die. Mr. McAlphin asks that the Court order that he be
provided medical treatment and transferred to another unit.
Judge Kearney recommends a finding that the motions for
injunctive relief be denied.
Court writes separately to address Mr. McAlphin's
objections. Judge Kearney determined that Mr. McAlphin
provided no evidence of a threat of irreparable harm to
support a hearing under Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL
Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). Judge
Kearney also found that Mr. McAlphin provided no evidence
that defendants had interfered with his mail, or somehow
caused others to interfere with his mail, or that he faced
irreparable harm if the Court did not grant his motion for
injunctive relief. Judge Kearney also noted that Mr. McAlphin
asserted no proof of retaliation by defendants and does not
have a constitutional right to parole. See Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1979).
Judge Kearney recommends that this Court deny Mr.
McAlphin's motions for injunctive relief (Dkt. Nos. 74,
76). Mr. McAlphin's objections, however, contend that the
Dataphase factors show that he is entitled to
injunctive relief (Dkt. No. 84). This Court disagrees with
Mr. McAlphin's assertion and finds that he has not
satisfied his burden under the Eighth Circuit-mandated
Dataphase factors to show that he is entitled to any
injunctive relief. 640 F.2d at 109, 113.
after careful review of the first Recommendation (Dkt. No.
80), the timely objections, and a de novo review of
the record, the Court concludes that the first Recommendation
should be, and hereby is, approved and adopted in its
entirety as this Court's findings in all respects. Mr.
McAlphin's motions for injunctive relief, whether
considered motions for temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction, are hereby denied (Dkt. Nos. 74, 76).
before the Court is the second Recommendation recommending
that this Court grant in part and deny in part the motion for
summary judgment filed by defendants Campbell and Cornes
(Dkt. No. 89). Defendants have filed an objection to the
second Recommendation (Dkt. No. 93).
Kearney recommends granting in part the motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants Campbell and Carnes as to Mr.
McAlphin's monetary claims against them in their official
capacities and denying in part the motion as to Mr.
McAlphin's monetary claims against them in their
individual capacities (Dkt. No. 89).
Court writes separately to address defendants' objections
to the second Recommendation (Dkt. No. 93). Defendants state
that when considering qualified immunity, “the courts
generally consider two questions: (1) whether the facts
alleged or shown, construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, establish a violation of a constitutional or
statutory right; and (2) whether that right was so clearly
established that a reasonable official would have known that
his or her actions were unlawful. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).” (Dkt. No. 93,
at 1-2 (quoting Dkt. No. 89, at 5)). Defendants claim that
Judge Kearney failed to conduct an analysis of either of
those prongs and that, based on the undisputed facts, Mr.
McAlphin failed to establish either prong (Dkt. No. 93, at
sustain a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, a
plaintiff must prove that defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a serious medical need. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In other words, Mr.
McAlphin must show: (1) that he suffered objectively serious
medical needs, and (2) that Sergeant Carnes actually knew of
but deliberately disregarded those needs. Dulany v.
Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). Sergeant
Carnes must have both been aware of Mr. McAlphin's
serious medical condition and drawn the inference that a
substantial risk of serious harm existed. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837.
Kearney found that “accepting [Mr. McAlphin's]
version of facts as true, a dispute of material fact exists
as to whether a reasonable person in the Defendants'
positions would have left [Mr. McAlphin] unattended, without
food, for the length of time at issue, and whether, after
being informed of his condition, they would have attempted to
seek medical attention for [Mr. McAlphin]. In addition,
several questions remain unanswered which the Court finds
necessary to determining this case. These include whether the
Defendants were under an obligation to inquire about [Mr.
McAlphin's] medications and/or medical condition prior to
transporting him, whether their duties included monitoring
[him] while in the Fayetteville courthouse cell, whether
Defendants should have arranged for [Mr. McAlphin] to receive
lunch at a reasonable time, and whether medical care for [Mr.
McAlphin] was accessible and/or necessary prior to their
return trip to the East Arkansas Regional Unit.” (Dkt.
No. 89, at 7).
Court examines the second Recommendation based on the record
that existed at the time Judge Kearney reviewed the motion
for summary judgment and issued the second Recommendation.
The Court will not consider supplements to the factual record
tendered by defendants at this stage of the proceedings. This
Court agrees that a dispute of material fact existed at the
time the second Recommendation was issued as to Mr.
McAlphin's Eighth Amendment claim against defendants
Campbell and Carnes in their individual capacities.
Accordingly, after careful review of the second
Recommendation (Dkt. No. 89), the timely objections, and a
de novo review of the record, the Court concludes
that the second Recommendation should be, and hereby is,
approved and adopted in its entirety as this Court's
findings in all respects. Defendants' motion for summary