SIXTH PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL COURT TO
CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS; MOTION TO
DISMISS RESPONDENT'S UNTIMELY RESPONSE; MOTION FOR REMAND
TO TRIAL COURT FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL; MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT PETITION; MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
MOTION TO REMAND TO TRIAL COURT FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; MOTION TO ADD TO MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT PETITION [PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO.
R. BAKER, Associate Justice
2002, petitioner, Anarian Chad Jackson, was found guilty by a
jury of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Charles
Raynor and was sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirmed.
Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468
(2004). Now before this court is Jackson's sixth pro se
petition requesting that this court reinvest jurisdiction in
the trial court in the case to consider a petition for writ
of error coram nobis. Also before this court are
Jackson's pro se motions to dismiss the State's
response to his petition, his pro se motion for remand to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing and appointment of
counsel, his pro se motion to supplement his coram nobis
petition, his pro se motion to supplement his motion to
remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and
appointment of counsel; and his pro se motion to add to
motion to supplement the petition. For the reasons set forth
below, Jackson's successive petition for coram nobis
relief is denied, and his pro se motions to supplement his
successive petition are denied. Jackson's remaining
motions are moot.
petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary
because the trial court can entertain a petition for writ of
error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on
appeal only after we grant permission. Newman v.
State, 2009 Ark. 539, at 5, 354 S.W.3d 61, 65. A writ of
error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy.
Nelson v. State, 2014 Ark. 91, at 3, 431 S.W.3d 852,
854. Coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong
presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid.
Id. The function of the writ is to secure relief
from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that
would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to
the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of
the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of
the judgment. Id. The petitioner has the burden of
demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the
record. Id. The writ is allowed only under
compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address
errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of
error coram nobis is available for addressing certain errors
that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the
time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material
evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party
confession to the crime during the time between conviction
and appeal. Id.; Howard v. State, 2012 Ark.
177, at 4, 403 S.W.3d 38, 43.
petitioner files successive applications for coram nobis
relief in this court, it is an abuse of the writ to argue the
same claims that have been addressed if the petitioner does
not allege new facts that are sufficient to distinguish his
latest claims from the prior claims. See United States v.
Camacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir.1996) (holding
that res judicata did not apply to bar a second petition for
writ of error coram nobis, but abuse-of-writ doctrine was
applied to subsume res judicata). Jackson has repeatedly
alleged in his successive petitions that investigators and
the prosecutor procured false testimony through threats and
promises and suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
allegations of a Brady violation fall within one of
the four categories of fundamental error that this court has
recognized in coram nobis proceedings, the fact that a
petitioner alleges a Brady violation alone is not
sufficient to provide a basis for error coram nobis relief.
See Cloird v. State, 357 Ark. 446, 452, 182 S.W.3d
477, 480 (2004) (setting forth the factors that must be
demonstrated to state a sufficient Brady claim). To merit
relief on a claim of a Brady violation, a petitioner
must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that
the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered, or
would have been prevented, had the information been disclosed
at trial. Id.
first petition, Jackson contended that the prosecutor had
elicited false testimony from trial witnesses Takesha
Griffin, who is Jackson's first cousin, and Chris Bush,
who was convicted as an accomplice in the murder of Raynor.
Jackson v. State, 2009 Ark. 176, at 1- 2 (per
curiam). We denied relief, finding no factual support for
Jackson's conclusory allegations. Id. at 3-5. In
his fifth petition for coram nobis relief, Jackson
focused on the testimony of Griffin and alleged that Griffin
had provided investigators with pretrial statements
exonerating Jackson and disclosing that Jackson was in Texas
at the time of the murder. Jackson v. State, 2014
Ark. 347, at 4, 439 S.W.3d 675, 677-78 (per curiam). We found
that allegations involving Griffin's testimony were not
extrinsic to the record, in that the trial record indicated
that the defense was aware of the alibi defense and was also
aware that Griffin had provided multiple contradictory
pretrial statements. Id. at 4-6, 439 S.W.3d at
sixth petition, Jackson again contends that Bush and
Griffin were coerced by investigators and
prosecutors through scare tactics and promises of leniency to
provide false testimony and suppressed exculpatory evidence
in violation of Brady. As with his previous
petitions, Jackson adds new factual details in support of his
reconstituted Brady claims.
now contends that the prosecutor secretly dismissed a firearm
charge arising from Bush's possession of a .40-caliber
weapon, provided a favorable resolution of a drug offense
committed by Bush in 1999, and misrepresented the facts
surrounding Bush's favorable treatment to the trial
court. In support of these new allegations, Jackson provides
excerpts from his trial transcript, a docket sheet from
Pulaski County pertaining to Bush's 1999 conviction, and
an affidavit from Bush recanting his testimony and
identifying "Little Mark, " who is also known as
Marcus Hunter, as the true perpetrator of the crime.
respect to Griffin's testimony, Jackson again contends
that her pretrial sworn statements implicating Jackson were
the product of police misconduct that occurred during the
time Griffin had spent with investigators over a period of
several days. Jackson attaches another affidavit from
Griffin, adding that she had engaged in oral sex with one of
the investigating officers and that investigators had
provided her with money to purchase crack cocaine in exchange
for providing sworn testimony to implicate Jackson. Jackson
maintains that the new facts set forth in Griffin's
current affidavit represent newly discovered information that
was known to prosecutors and withheld from the defense in
violation of Brady.
further alleges that the prosecutor had been put on notice
that Detective Knowles, who Griffin alleges had pressured her
to provide false testimony, had been previously accused of
misconduct and attempting to bribe witnesses. In support of
this allegation, Jackson cites Collier v. State,
CACR-00-348 (Ark. Sept. 20, 2001) (unpublished per
curiam), wherein this court denied a petition for a writ of
error coram nobis which was based in part on an allegation
that "the Little Rock Police Department"
paid a witness $300.00 for his testimony and had additionally
promised the witness a $10, 000 reward in exchange for false
testimony. Collier, Slip op. at 2. According to
Jackson, the prosecutor had a duty to disclose this evidence
of Knowles's prior misconduct.
affidavits and attached trial transcript and docket sheet
fail to substantiate Jackson's allegations, and in fact,
demonstrate that the prosecutor made no misrepresentations to
the trial court and did not dismiss a firearm charge. As
to Bush's affidavit, we have explained that recanted
testimony, standing alone, is not cognizable in an error
coram nobis proceeding. See Smith v. State, 200 Ark.
767, 140 S.W.2d 675 (1940) (holding that the writ was not
available to afford relief on the ground that the principal
witness against the accused had recanted and that others
since the accused's conviction had confessed to the
crime); see also Taylor v. State, 303 Ark. 586, 799
S.W.2d 519 (1990) (A witness's recantation of part of his
trial testimony was not a ground for the writ as recantation
of testimony did not fit within the remedy.).
not required to accept the allegations in a petition for writ
of error coram nobis at face value. Instead, we look to the
reasonableness of the allegations of the petition and to the
existence of the probability of the truth thereof.
Howard, 2012 Ark. 177, at 5, 403 S.W.3d at 43.
Griffin's affidavit is simply another example of
Griffin's history of providing multiple accounts of the
facts surrounding the pretrial sworn statements she provided
to investigators and prosecutors. Finally, Jackson's
contention surrounding evidence of prior misconduct on the
part of Detective Knowles is without merit in that the case
relied upon by Jackson did not establish the existence of
credible evidence that Knowles or any officer with the Little
Rock Police department had engaged in witness tampering.
See Collier, slip op., at 2.
the addition of new factual allegations surrounding the
testimony of Bush and Griffin are not sufficient to
distinguish the claims from his earlier claims in that
Jackson's new allegations are conclusory, involve matters
that were known or could have been discovered at the time of
trial, and otherwise fail to establish that material evidence
had been withheld by the prosecution in violation of
Brady. Affidavits from Bush and Griffin fail to
create a reasonable probability that the new allegations
contained therein are meritorious such that issuance of the
writ is warranted. Howar ...