United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLMES, III CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Steven Myers, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983. He proceeds pro se and in forma
pauperis. The case is before the Court for preservice
screening under the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
to the allegations of the amended complaint (Doc. 6),
Plaintiff was being held at the Washington County Detention
Center on a parole hold and a pending criminal charge.
Plaintiff alleges his parole officer faxed paperwork to the
detention center in September of 2016 lifting the parole
the paperwork being lost and the computer still showing the
hold as active, Plaintiff alleges he could not post bond.
Plaintiff remained incarcerated from September of 2016 until
January 3, 2017. Plaintiff states he “could have paid
for bond” and been released during this period of time.
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
false imprisonment is ordinarily a tort claim left to state
law, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146
(1979)(“false imprisonment does not become a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a
state official”), there are circumstances when a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is at issue. For instance, in Davis
v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 717 (8th Cir. 2004), the Eighth
Circuit held that there is a “protected liberty
interest in being free from wrongful, prolonged
incarceration.” In Davis, Plaintiff was
detained for fifty-seven days after a judge ordered his
release. In Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730, 733 (8th
Cir. 2009), the Eighth Circuit noted that there was also a
liberty interest in being released after a prison sentence
has been served. To be applicable, the Plaintiff must show a
right to release. Golberg v. Hennepin Cty., 417 F.3d
808, 811-12 (8th Cir. 2005). We will assume that Plaintiff
had a right to be released on bail when the hold was lifted.
something more is needed before a plausible claim is stated
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Liability under § 1983 is
personal. Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 965 (8th
Cir. 2005). “To recover § 1983 damages from
[Sheriff Helder] individually, [Plaintiff] must establish
that [Sheriff Helder] was personally involved in, or directly
responsible for, [Plaintiff's] prolonged incarceration
and that [Sheriff Helder] was deliberately indifferent to
[Plaintiff's] plight.” Dahl, 580 F.3d at
733 (internal citations omitted). General responsibility over
a detention facility is “insufficient to establish
personal involvement.” Ouzts v. Cummins, 825
F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987).
has not alleged deliberate indifference on the part of any
person. Rather, he alleges the faxed document was lost.
Further, Plaintiff has not alleged any personal involvement
on the part of Sheriff Helder. Thus, there is no basis for
finding Sheriff Helder individually liable. Finally,
Plaintiff has not alleged a custom or policy of Washington
County was the moving force behind his prolonged detention.
Thus, there is no basis for official capacity liability.
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)(no vicarious liability for governmental
entities--liability must be based on custom or policy).
plausible claim is stated. The Complaint is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) (in forma pauperis action, or any
portion of it, may be ...