United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLMES, III CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Marc Edward LeMeur, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983. He proceeds pro se. He has also filed a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).
case is before the Court for preservice screening under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the
obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
to the allegations of the complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff is
incarcerated under an invalid/unlawful conviction. He
maintains the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him
because he is, among other things, a sovereign man.
his criminal proceeding, he alleges, among other things, that
he was removed from the courtroom by both Judge John Scott
and Judge Karren. He alleges they both refused to honor his
status or to demonstrate that they had jurisdiction over him.
He was convicted of a felony and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment on December 16, 2016.
asks that he immediately be released, his “conviction
be dismissed, and that he be made whole.
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
PLRA also contains a “three strikes” provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) which limits the ability of a
prisoner, who has filed at least three claims that have been
dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a
claim, to obtain IFP status. Court records demonstrate that
Plaintiff has filed at least three cases which were dismissed
as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim: (1)
LeMeur v. Daniels, et al., Civil No. 09-5256
(dismissed 7/16/2010--§ 1915(g) strike flag entered);
(2) LeMeur v. Daniels, et al., Civil No. 09-5259
(dismissed 8/6/2010--§ 1915(g) strike flag entered); and
(3) LeMeur v. Daniels, et al., Civil No. 09-5260
(dismissed 7/14/2010-- § 1915(g) strike flag entered).
Plaintiff also had at least two other cases that count as
strikes but did not have a strike flag entered: (1)
LeMeur v. Vaughn, Civil No. 09-5257 (dismissed
10/19/2010--report and recommendation adopted in
toto which recommended dismissal as frivolous or for
failure to state a claim and entry of a strike flag); and (2)
LeMeur v. Daniels, et al., Civil No. 09-5261
(dismissed May 4, 2010--report and recommendation adopted
in toto which recommended dismissal as frivolous or
for failure to state a claim and entry of a strike flag).
Plaintiff has at least three strikes, he may still proceed
IFP if he is under “under imminent danger of serious
physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff
has made no such allegations. Therefore, he is not eligible
to proceed IFP.
case is also subject to dismissal because it is frivolous.
Judge Scott and Judge Karren are immune from suit.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991)("Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not
just from ultimate assessment of damages"); see also
Duty v. City of Springdale,42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir.
1994). "Judges performing judicial functions enjoy
absolute immunity from § 1983 liability."
Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir.
1994). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he ...