Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Garrett v. Colvin

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division

August 18, 2017

CLARA JEAN GARRETT PLAINTIFF
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          HON. BARRY A. BRYANT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Clara Jean Garrett (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and a period of disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act.

         The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.[1] Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

         1. Background:

         Plaintiff protectively filed her disability applications March 27, 2013. (Tr. 14). In her applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to fibromyalgia, restless leg syndrome, and carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 200). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of March 15, 2013. (Tr. 14). These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 66-113).

         Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied applications. (Tr. 135-136). This hearing request was granted, and Plaintiff's administrative hearing was held on November 12, 2014 in Texarkana, Arkansas. (Tr. 30-65). The ALJ determined Plaintiff was fifty (50) years old on her alleged onset date. (Tr. 35). Such a person is categorized as a “person closely approaching advanced age” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(d). As for her education, the ALJ determined she had obtained her GED but had no additional training beyond that. (Tr. 35-36).

         Subsequent to this hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff's applications. (Tr. 11-24). In that decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2017. (Tr. 17, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since March 15, 2013, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 17, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia, obesity, restless leg syndrome, and diminished left eye vision. (Tr. 17-18, Finding 3). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 18-19, Finding 4).

         In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and determined her RFC. (Tr. 19-23, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and found her claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform a wide range of light work:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she is limited to lifting 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; she is unlimited in her ability to push and/or pull (including operation of hand and/or foot controls), other than shown for her ability to lift and/or carry; she is limited to sitting 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, no more than 2 hours continuously; standing and walking no more than 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, no more than 2 hours continuously; she is able to occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and/or scaffolds, climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, bend, squat, kneel, crawl, and crouch; she is able to count fingers at 3 meters with her left eye and her right eye has no limits; and she has no hearing, manipulative, environment, or communication limitations. She has no mental or other impairments that would prevent her from understanding, remembering, and carrying out job tasks and instructions; paying attention; interacting sufficiently with others; make job related decisions, or adapts to changes in the work environment. See SSR 83-12.

Id.

         Considering her RFC, the ALJ determined whether Plaintiff was able to perform any of her Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) during the relevant time period. (Tr. 23-24, Finding 6). Considering her PRW and her RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity of performing her PRW as a cashier/checker (semi-skilled, light). (Tr. 23-24, Finding 6). Because she retained the capacity of performing her PRW, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined by the Act, from March 15, 2013 through the date of his decision or through May 28, 2015. (Tr. 24, Finding 7).

         Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 8). On August 15, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Id. On September 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs and have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. ECF Nos. 5, 11-12. This case is now ready for decision.

         2. Applicable Law:

         In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart,292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. See Johnson v. Apfel,240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See Haley v. Massanari,258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.