FROM THE ARKANSAS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT
[NO. 01SCR-15-34] HONORABLE DAVID G. HENRY, JUDGE
Chachawal Chawangkul, pro se appellant.
Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass't
Att'y Gen., for appellee.
F. VIRDEN, JUDGE
Chachawal Chawangkul appeals from the Arkansas County Circuit
Court's order denying and dismissing his pro se petition
for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of
Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2015). We assumed jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to footnote 1 in Barnes v. State,
2017 Ark. 76, 511 S.W.3d 845 (per curiam). On appeal,
Chawangkul argues that the trial court erred in denying his
petition because his trial counsel's failure to call the
victim's grandmother as a witness establishes that his
trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the trial
not reverse the grant or denial of postconviction relief
unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.
Sandrelli v. State, 2017 Ark. 156, 517 S.W.3d 417. A
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence
to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the
entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.
the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a petitioner seeking
postconviction relief must show that his counsel's
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
resulted in prejudice. See Feuget v. State, 2015
Ark. 43, 454 S.W.3d 734. Under this standard, the petitioner
must first show that counsel's performance was deficient.
Id. This requires a showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel deprived the petitioner of the
counsel guaranteed to the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. Second, the deficient performance must have
resulted in prejudice so pronounced as to have deprived the
petitioner of a fair trial, the outcome of which cannot be
relied on as just. Id. Both showings are necessary
before it can be said that the conviction resulted from a
breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result
unreliable. Id. There is no reason for a court
deciding an ineffective-assistance claim to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one. Fukunaga v. State, 2016
Ark. 164, 489 S.W.3d 644.
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did
not call the victim's grandmother to testify as a
witness. The decision whether to call a witness is generally
a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of
Rule 37. Feuget, supra. An attorney's
decision not to call a particular witness is largely a matter
of professional judgment, and the fact that there was a
witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony
beneficial to the defense is not, in and of itself, proof of
ineffectiveness. Under Strickland, the petitioner
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to
call a witness must show that, but for the alleged error in
not calling the witness, there was a reasonable probability
that the jury would have reached a different decision.
Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, 308 S.W.3d 596. To make
this showing, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel is required to state the substance of the omitted
witness's testimony, establish that the testimony would
have been admissible, and demonstrate that the omission of
the testimony resulted in actual prejudice to his or her
defense. Stiggers v. State, 2014 Ark. 184, 433
Chawangkul did not disclose the substance of the
grandmother's testimony and otherwise failed to make the
required showings. Accordingly, Chawangkul did not
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, and
we need not address whether he suffered prejudice by
counsel's failure to call the grandmother as a witness.
and Murphy, JJ., agree.
A jury found Chawangkul guilty of
second-degree sexual assault of a child. In Chawangkul v.
State, 2016 Ark.App. 599, 509 S.W.3d 10, this court