KOREY K. BROWN APPELLANT
STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE
FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST DIVISION [NO.
60CR-14-2410] HONORABLE LEON JOHNSON, JUDGE
William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Clint Miller,
Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace,
Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
J. GLADWIN, JUDGE
Korey Brown, appeals his conviction by the Pulaski County
Circuit Court on a charge of committing theft of automobile
by threat, for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender
to eighteen years' imprisonment. Appellant's sole
point on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
April 6, 2016, the State filed an amended three-count felony
information alleging that on or about January 22, 2014,
appellant committed three felony offenses against J.L. The
three felony offenses were (1) rape; (2) kidnapping; and (3)
theft of J.L.'s automobile by threat of serious physical
injury. In the information, the State also alleged that
appellant was a habitual offender with four or more prior
appellant's jury trial held on May 10-12, 2016, the State
offered proof through J.L.'s testimony that appellant
allegedly threatened J.L. in order to obtain her automobile.
She testified as to the events that occurred early on the
morning of January 22, 2014, involving her encounter with
appellant that resulted in the above-described charges.
preserved at trial the issue now on appeal at trial by
complying with Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1(a)
(2016) when, at the close of the State's presentation of
its case-in-chief, appellant's trial counsel moved for a
directed verdict on theft by threat as a lesser offense of
theft by threat of serious physical injury, based on the
State's failure to prove that appellant made any kind of
threat to J.L. in order to obtain her automobile. The trial
court denied this directed-verdict motion. At the close of
presentation of all the evidence, appellant's counsel
renewed the earlier motion for a directed verdict, which the
trial court also denied.
jury was unable to reach a verdict on the rape charge but
found appellant (1) not guilty of kidnapping and (2) guilty
of having committed theft of J.L.'s automobile by threat.
The jury sentenced appellant, as a habitual offender, to
eighteen years' imprisonment pursuant to a sentencing
order filed on May 24, 2016, and an amended sentencing order
filed on June 2, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal on June 20, 2016.
Standard of Review
denial of a motion for directed verdict is treated as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Petty v.
State, 2017 Ark.App. 347, S.W.3d . When the sufficiency
of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Id. The appellate court considers only the evidence
that supports the verdict. Id. The verdict will be
affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient
force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a
conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture.
Id. This court does not weigh the evidence presented
at trial nor does this court assess the credibility of
witnesses. Fronterhouse v. State, 2015 Ark.App. 211,
463 S.W.3d 312. The fact-finder is free to believe all or
part of a witness's testimony and may resolve all
questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence.
Id. Inconsistent testimony does not render proof
insufficient as a matter of law. Harmon v. State,
340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000). Criminal intent can be
inferred from one's behavior under the circumstances.
Id. It is presumed that a person intends the natural
and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.
argues that the State failed to introduce substantial
evidence that he obtained J.L.'s automobile by threat.
Appellant submits that J.L.'s testimony established that,
while his conduct showed an intention to inflict harm toward
her, the State failed to introduce substantial evidence that
appellant's menacing behavior was specifically directed
toward obtaining J.L.'s automobile. He notes that J.L.
never specifically testified that she let appellant obtain
her automobile because she believed he would harm her.
Appellant submits that the jury had to speculate as to what
offense the State was arguing that his conduct was directed
toward achieving-the rape, the kidnapping, or the theft of