United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights case filed by the Plaintiff, Michael L.
Phipps, under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and has filed an
application to proceed in forma pauperis
("IFP")(Doc. 2). He is currently incarcerated in
the Washington County Detention Center ("WCDC").
Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") modified the
IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, to require the Court to
screen complaints for dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if
it contains claims that: (a) are frivolous or malicious; (b)
fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or,
(c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
to the allegations of the Complaint (Doc. 1), in 2004,
Plaintiff was convicted of second degree sexual assault on
his wife in Texas. He was sentenced to five years in prison.
He was a low-risk level-one sex offender.
about November 11, 2009, Plaintiff came to Fayetteville and
reported to Detective Leonard Graves. Plaintiff alleges
Detective Graves put the wrong social security number
("SSN") on Plaintiffs paper work. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Plaintiff states that when he pointed this out, Detective
Graves added Plaintiffs SSN to the paperwork by writing it
below the wrong SSN. Plaintiff alleges Detective Graves
refused to take the wrong number off. Plaintiff sues
Detective Graves for "mistaken identity" in his
personal capacity only. Id. Plaintiff alleges the
same cause of action against the John and Jane Doe
Defendants. Id. at 7. However, he sues the Doe
Defendants in their official capacities only. Id.
about January 1, 2010, Plaintiff alleges the Sex Offender
Screening and Risk Assessment ("SOSRA") Committee
mistakenly combined his criminal record with that of another
sex offender, a child molester, who has the same first and
last names as the Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff alleges
he was raised from a level-one sex offender to a level-three.
he was a level-three offender, Plaintiff alleges he could not
find any housing and became homeless. See Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 5-14-128 (residency restrictions on level-three
offenders). According to Plaintiff, in Washington County, a
homeless sex offender may not register. His being homeless
resulted in his being charged with failure to register and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
states that once in prison, he made parole right away but
could not parole out to his sister's house because he was
a level-three offender. Similarly, Plaintiff states he found
out from the director of transitional housing and half way
houses that none of the facilities in Arkansas would accept a
level-three offender. As a result of being unable to find
housing, Plaintiff states he spent three-and-a-half years in
states he brought the mistake to the attention of the SOSRA
Committee. In 2015, Plaintiff alleges the SOSRA Committee
"admitted" its mistake but refused to lower his
level. Id. at 6. Plaintiff has now been arrested
"waiting to go to prison again for being
homeless!!!" Id. (emphasis in
relief, Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive
damages. He also asks that his name be removed from the sex
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen a case prior to
service of process being issued. A claim is frivolous when
it-lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A
claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court
bears in mind, however, that when "evaluating whether a
pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to
state a claim, we hold 'a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, .... to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'"
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
claims are subject to dismissal. First, the statute of
limitations bars his claims against Detective Graves and the
Washington County John and Jane Does. Section 1983 does not
contain its own statute of limitation. Instead, causes of
action under § 1983 are governed by "the most
appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations."
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,482 U.S. 656, 660
(1987)(§ 1981 case). In Arkansas, this is the three-year
personal injury statute of limitations, Ark. Code Ann.
16-56-105(3); see Miller v. Norris,247 F.3d 736,
739 (8th Cir. 2001) (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3) is