United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division
OPINION AND ORDER
Webber Wright UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Mullen brings this action against the Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission (AGFC), an agency of the State of Arkansas, and
Jeff Crow, Director of the AGFC, alleging gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42
U.S.C. § 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993
(ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101 et seq.
Mullen claims the defendants violated these statutes when she
was demoted on April 4, 2017, from her AGFC position as Chief
of the Educational Division to the position of East Arkansas
Regional Education Coordinator.
the Court are the following motions: (1) motion of the AGFC
to dismiss the amended complaint, or in the alternative,
motion to quash [doc.#11]; and (2) motion of Crow to dismiss
the amended complaint [doc.#27]. Mullen has responded in
opposition to the AGFC's motion to dismiss or to quash
and the AGFC has filed a reply to Mullen's response.
Mullen has not responded to Crow's motion to dismiss and
the time for doing so has passed. For the reasons that
follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
AGFC's motion to dismiss or to quash and grants
Crow's motion to dismiss.
AGFC's Motion to Dismiss or to Quash
AGFC first argues that this action should be dismissed
because it was not properly served. It appears that this
issue has since been resolved so the Court denies the
AGFC's motion to dismiss for lack of proper service.
AGFC next argues that Mullen's ACRA claim must be
dismissed because of sovereign immunity. The Court agrees.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-104 (“Nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to waive the sovereign immunity
of the State of Arkansas.”). See also Brooks v.
Gillespie, No. 4:16cv00473 SWW, 2017 WL 4295195, at *2
(E.D. Ark. Sept. 27, 2017) (citing Ark. Code Ann. §
16-123-104 in granting summary judgment, based on sovereign
immunity, on plaintiff's ACRA claim brought against
Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services sued in
her official capacity). Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Mullen's ACRA claim against the AGFC.
AGFC next argues that Mullen's 42 U.S.C. § 1981
claim must be dismissed on the ground, inter alia,
that § 1981 does not provide a cause of action for
gender discrimination. The Court agrees. See Lake v.
Honeywell, Inc., No. 4-96-944, 1997 WL 458463, at *5
(May 27, 1997) (noting that it is well settled that claims
for gender discrimination are not viable claims under §
1981 and collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Mullen's gender discrimination claim under § 1981.
the AGFC argues that Mullen's request for liquated or
special damages must be dismissed because Title VII does not
provide for the availability of such damages. Mullen does not
dispute the AGFC's argument on this point so the Court
dismisses Mullen's request for liquidated or special
damages. See, e.g., Baker v. John Morrell & Co.,
263 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1183 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (“Title VII,
of course, does not contain a liquidated damages
provision.”); Celli v. Wynne, No. 1:06cv1DAK,
2006 WL 2708359, at *5 (D. Utah, Northern Div., Sept. 19,
2006) (noting that “‘special damages' are not
authorized by Title VII.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. §