United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Harrison Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS, UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE.
proceeds in this matter pro se and in forma
pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently
before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment by
Defendant Nurse Woods (ECF No. 50) and Defendants Day,
Johnson, Kircher, and Moore (the "Boone County
Defendants") (ECF No. 54). For the reasons explained in
more detail below, the Motions are GRANTED.
filed his Complaint on October 20, 2016. (ECF No. 1). On
November 17, 2016, the Court entered an Order directing
Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 20).
Plaintiff filed an Addendum to Amended Complaint on November
23, 2016 (ECF No. 21), and a First Amended Complaint on
November 28, 2016. (ECF No. 23).
claims arise from his incarceration in the Boone County
Detention Center ("BCDC") from September 21, 2016,
through October 19, 2016, for a parole revocation. (ECF No.
23, pp. 4, 7, 9, 10). Plaintiff proceeds against Defendants
in their personal capacities only. (ECF No. 23, pp. 5, 6, 8,
9, 10). In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges a failure to protect
on the part of Defendants Nurse Woods and Sheriff
Moore. Specifically, he alleges that Nurse Woods
knew that another inmate in Plaintiff's pod had a Staph
infection, but she left that inmate in in the pod, where he
exposed Plaintiff to the risk of contracting the infection.
He contends that Sheriff Moore was "responsible for
providing a safe, secure, and healthy environment" in
the BCDC, but failed to do so. (ECF No. 23, p. 5). With
respect to his injuries resulting from exposure to Staph, he
initially claimed in his Amended Complaint that he "got
sick, " (ECF No. 23, pp. 4-5), but he later clarified in
his deposition that he did not, in fact, get sick,
but had only been fearful that he might become infected with
Staph. (ECF No. 56-5, p. 30).
Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical care
by Nurse Woods and Jail Administrator Day. He maintains that
even though at the time he was fearful that he had been
exposed to a Staph infection, he "would not verbally
agree to pay for a sick call" because he believed Nurse
Woods was to blame for exposing him to the illness. (ECF No.
23, p. 8).
Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Day denied him
mental health care. (ECF No. 23, p. 8).
Claim Four, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Day, Kircher,
Johnson, and Sheriff Moore retaliated against him for writing
grievances about the Staph infection and perhaps other
matters. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was supposed
to serve a 90-day sentence in the BCDC, but because of the
grievances he filed, jail officials decided to send him to
the Arkansas Department of Correction ("ADC")-a
much more restrictive environment-to finish out his sentence.
(ECF No. 23, p. 10). Plaintiff also alleges in Claim Four
that Defendant Kircher violated a court order when he
"brought up old lawsuits" that Plaintiff had
previously filed against the BCDC. (ECF No. 23, p. 11).
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Kircher stated that the
BCDC needed to get rid of him "because he always sues
us." (ECF No. 21, p. 1). Finally, Claim Four also
alleges that Defendant Johnson failed to protect some of
Plaintiffs personal property that he had left in his cell at
the BCDC when he was transferred to ADC custody. Id.
at p. 3. Plaintiff does not identify the lost property.
Woods filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18, 2017.
(ECF No. 50). The Boone County Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on May 30, 2017 (ECF No. 54), and
Supplements to their Motion were filed on May 31, 2017 (ECF
No. 57), and July 27, 2017 (ECF No. 62). Plaintiff filed his
combined Response to both Motions on August 18, 2017. (ECF
judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record
"shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "Once a party
moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing,
the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth
specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that
a genuine issue of material fact exists." Nat'l
Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607
(8th Cir. 1999).
non-moving party "must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They
must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury
verdict in their favor." Nat'l Bank, 165
F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case founded on
speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion
for summary judgment." Id. (citing Metge v.
Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). "When
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version
of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
Woods argues that the case against her should be dismissed
for the following reasons: (1) she was not subjectively aware
of any inmate with a Staph infection or any other openly
communicable infection in the BCDC during the period
Plaintiff was housed there, and (2) she was not deliberately
indifferent to ...