United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
O. Hickey Susan O. Hickey United States District Judge
a civil rights action filed pro se by Plaintiff,
Clifton Orlando Solomon, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by Defendants Corporal Griffie,  Warden Brazell,
Ron Stovall, and Corporal T. Hanning. (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff
has filed a Response. (ECF No. 40). The Court finds this
matter ripe for consideration.
filed his Complaint on June 29, 2016. (ECF No. 1). On July
27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Supplement to his Complaint
clarifying his claims. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff is suing
Defendants Griffie, Brazell, Stovall, and Hanning in both
their individual and official capacities.Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages and states “I am
seeking that all be removed from Miller county Jail and make
this a better Jail.” (ECF No. 1).
March 24, 2016, Plaintiff was arrested and booked into the
Miller County Detention Center (“MCDC”). At the
time Plaintiff filed his Complaint he was a pre-trial
detainee. Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were
violated when Defendant Griffie, without just cause, ordered
a lock down of Plaintiff's entire pod for three days
without allowing him access to a phone or television.
Plaintiff also alleges his rights were violated because the
MCDC does not provide drinking water or exercise equipment
during recreational time and there are no MCDC officers
present to protect inmates during the hour of recreation. In
addition, Plaintiff asserts that, while a pre-trial detainee,
he was housed with inmates who had been convicted of crimes.
Plaintiff claims that this policy is unconstitutional.
alleges that Defendant Hanning violated his civil rights when
he “[i]nterfeared [sic] with grievance
procedure[.]” (ECF No. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff also claims
his rights were violated because “Miller County has the
most (Improper grievance procedure) thire [sic] is no change
of command or even a proper procedure that the grievance go
through[.]” (ECF No. 11, p. 2). As for Defendants
Brazell and Stovall, Plaintiff claims “[they] support
officer who abuse thire [sic] power while [they] is not on
the facility. [They] also has knowledge of officer abuseing
[sic] thire [sic] power in which supports cruel and unusual
punishment[.]” (ECF No. 1, p. 7).
argue they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1)
there is no individual capacity liability based on
respondeat superior for Defendants Stovall and
Brazell; (2) Plaintiff was afforded his rights to due
process; (3) there is no constitutional right to the
answering of grievances; (4) Plaintiff was not subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement; (5) Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity; and (6) there is no basis
for official capacity liability. (ECF No. 29).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a party
moves for summary judgment, the court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Krenik
v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1995). The
inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is a need for trial-whether, in other words,
there are genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably
be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also
Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732 (8th Cir.
1987); Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus.
Union-Mgmt. Pension Fund, 800 F.2d 742, 746 (8th Cir.
1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects
the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
Id. at 252.
Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be
reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna
Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party
bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Id. The nonmoving party must then
demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record
that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47
F.3d at 957. A party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or
denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
256. However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Defendants Stovall and Brazell
claims Defendants Stovall and Brazell violated his
constitutional rights because they support other MCDC
officers who abuse their power. In order to state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
each defendant acted under color of state law and that he or
she violated a right secured by the constitution. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (8th Cir. 1999). The deprivation
must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to
state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under
§ 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). To
establish liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must
“plead that a government official has personally
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2014).
“A supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for an employee's unconstitutional
activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280
(8th Cir. 1994).
case, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Stovall or
Brazell were personally involved in any of the alleged
violations of his rights. He only claims these Defendants had
knowledge of other's actions and “supported”
them-this is insufficient to establish § 1983 liability.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's ...