Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Crayton v. State

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division I

February 14, 2018

REGINALD CRAYTON APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE

         APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FCR-16-589] HONORABLE STEPHEN TABOR, JUDGE.

          The Lancaster Law Firm, PLLC, by: Clinton W. Lancaster, for appellant.

          Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Rebecca Bailey Kane, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

          RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, JUDGE.

         A Sebastian County jury convicted appellant Reginald Crayton of first-degree domestic battering, a Class B felony, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-26-303(a)(5) & (b)(1) (Repl. 2013) and sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, Crayton argues that the circuit court erred by admitting evidence of his prior domestic-battering convictions during the guilt phase of the trial and by using the Arkansas model jury instruction, AMI Crim. 2610, on first-degree domestic battering. We disagree and affirm.

         Crayton was charged with and convicted of first-degree domestic battering under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-26-303(a)(5) for injuring his live-in companion and former wife, Candace Crayton. The statute requires the State to prove that (1) he committed second-or third-degree battering and that (2) he had two previous domestic-battering convictions for conduct within the ten years before the current domestic-battering offense.[1] On appeal, Crayton maintains that the circuit court erred by admitting evidence of the previous domestic-battering convictions during the guilt phase because the previous crimes are not elements of first-degree domestic battering. The State contends that he is wrong.

         Both Crayton and the State agree that, specifically on this question, appellate interpretation and application of the first-degree domestic-battering statute is an issue of first impression. Appellate courts review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is our responsibility to determine the meaning of a statute. See, e.g., Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). In the absence of a showing that the circuit court erred, its interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Shults, 2017 Ark. 300, 529 S.W.3d 628.

         The statute defining first-degree domestic battering provides the following: (a) A person commits domestic battering in the first degree if:

(1) With the purpose of causing serious physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes serious physical injury to a family or household member by means of a deadly weapon;
(2) With the purpose of seriously and permanently disfiguring a family or household member or of destroying, amputating, or permanently disabling a member or organ of a family or household member's body, the person causes such an injury to a family or household member;
(3) The person causes serious physical injury to a family or household member under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life;
(4) The person knowingly causes serious physical injury to a family or household member he or she knows to be sixty (60) years of age or older or twelve (12) years of age or younger;
(5) The person:
(A) Commits any act of domestic battering as defined in ยง 5-26-304 or ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.