United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, El Dorado Division
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
BARRY A. BRYANT, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
RONNIE FLOW, (“FLOW”) an inmate confined at the
Grimes Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC),
Newport, Arkansas, filed this petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court
directed FLOW to file an Addendum to clarify his claims, and
he has done so. ECF No. 5. The Respondent was served with a
copy of the Petition and Addendum and has responded. ECF No.
16. FLOW thereafter forwarded a letter to the Court. ECF No.
19. The letter has been field as a Reply to the Response and
Petition was referred for findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case. The
Court has reviewed the Petition, the Response, pleadings, and
all exhibits submitted in this case. For the following
reasons, the Court recommends the Petition be
Procedural Background 
March 8, 1999, FLOW pled guilty to sexual abuse in the first
degree in the Circuit Court of Ouachita County, Arkansas,
case number CR 98-136. He was sentenced to 60 months
probation, a $1, 000.00 fine and $150.00 in court costs. ECF
No. 16-1. The judgment was filed on May 7, 1999. That
sentence expired several years ago, and FLOW acknowledges he
is not currently being held in custody by the State of
Arkansas as a result of this 1999 conviction. ECF No. 5, p.
30, 2017, in the Circuit Court of Columbia County Arkansas,
case number CR-2016-15, FLOW entered a guilty plea to two
counts of second-degree sexual assault. He was sentenced to a
total of 25 years of imprisonment with an additional 15-year
suspended sentence. In the written plea agreement in this
2017 case, FLOW acknowledged he had “2 prior
felonies.” ECF No. 16-3, p. 3.
February 13, 2017, FLOW filed the instant Petition for
habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 in this Court. He challenges his 1996 state court
conviction and raises the following claims for relief:
1. He alleges he was not convicted at trial and did not enter
a plea of guilty. ECF No. 1, p. 5; and
2. He alleges he suffers from a mental condition which led to
him “being taken advantage of.” He also claims he
did “not sign (guilty plea). . .” ECF No. 1, p.
seeks expungement of the 1996 conviction on the foregoing
grounds, stating “I already won this case in court I
never signed the paper or did I plead guilty.” ECF No.
5, p. 2.
Respondent asserts the claims in the Petition are time-barred
by 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A), FLOW is not “in
custody” pursuant to the challenged conviction, FLOW
has procedurally defaulted his claims, and
“expungement” is not a remedy afforded by §
2254. ECF No.
FLOW has raised the issue of his mental capacity, the Court
has Ordered the parties to produce any records they have
regarding this issue. ECF No. 18. FLOW requested an extension
of time to provide the records regarding his mental capacity
but never produced any records. The Respondent produced over 100
pages of records from FLOW's most recent criminal case
and from the ADC. The Court has reviewed all of these records
as well as the pleadings and other exhibits filed by the
One-year Statute of Limitations:
April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA") was signed into
law. The law made several changes to the federal habeas
corpus statutes, including the addition of a one-year
statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). The AEPDA provides that the one-year limitations
period shall run from the latest of four possible situations.
Section 2244(d)(1)(A) specifies the limitations period shall
run from the date a judgment becomes final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review. Section 2244(d)(1)(B) specifies the limitations
period shall run from the date an impediment to filing
created by the State is removed. Section 2244(d)(1)(C)
specifies the limitations period shall run from the date in
which a constitutional right has been initially recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) states the
limitation period shall run from "the date on which the
factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence."
2244(d)(2) also provides the time during which a
"properly filed application" for state
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to
the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation. Also, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also held
that "the one-year period is equitably tolled when
‘extraordinary circumstances' have made it
impossible for the ...