United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division
MARCUS P. CHAPPLE PLAINTIFF
TIM RYALS, et al. DEFENDANTS
Procedures for Filing Objections
Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has
been sent to Chief Judge Brian S. Miller. Parties may file
written objections to this Recommendation, which should be
specific and should include the factual or legal basis for
the objection. To be considered, all objections must be
received in the office of the Court Clerk within 14 days of
objections are filed, Judge Miller can adopt this
Recommendation without independently reviewing the record. By
not objecting, parties risk waiving the right to appeal
questions of fact.
January 26, 2018, Plaintiff Marcus Chapple, formerly an
inmate at the Faulkner County Detention Center, filed this 42
U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit without the help of a lawyer.
(Docket entry #1) In his brief in support of his complaint,
Mr. Chapple alleged that the conditions of his confinement at
the Detention Center were unconstitutional and that
Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious
mental and physical health needs.
have now moved for summary judgment, arguing that he failed
to fully exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
this lawsuit. (#16) Mr. Chapple has responded to the motion
(#21), and it is ripe for review.
Court must dismiss any claim that was not fully exhausted
before the date a complaint was filed. See 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted”); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90
(2006) (explaining the proper exhaustion of remedies
“means using all steps that the [prison] holds out, and
doing so properly”); Johnson v. Jones, 340
F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003) (“If exhaustion was not
completed at the time of filing, dismissal is
are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. For example,
prisoners can be excused from exhausting administrative
remedies when correction officials have prevented them from
using grievance procedures or when officials have themselves
failed to comply with administrative procedures. Miller
v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001); Foulk
v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2001). But
the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are few. An
inmate's subjective belief about the effectiveness of the
grievance process does not excuse a failure to exhaust; nor
does confusion about the requirements for exhaustion.
Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir.
requirements may vary from prison to prison because “it
is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 91.
support of their motion, Defendants attach Mr. Chapple's
grievance records. (#19-2) It is undisputed that Mr. Chapple
failed to raise any of the constitutional violations alleged
in this lawsuit in the grievances that he
response to the Defendants' motion, Mr. Chapple argues
that the grievance procedure at the Detention Center is
insufficiently accessible. He states that inmates must use a
kiosk to submit their grievances and that inmates are not
afforded any privacy while they submit their grievances.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chapple's beliefs regarding the
inadequacy of the Detention Center's grievance procedure
are insufficient to excuse him from exhausting his
Chapple has not come forward with any evidence to show that
he did exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the
claims he raises in this lawsuit. Under settled law, Mr.
Chapple was required to grieve his claims and to fully