United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Harrison Division
MINDY L. GREEN PLAINTIFF
DR. ROY LEE, Mediquick, Harrison, Arkansas; CITY OF HARRISON POLICE DEPARTMENT; and BOONE COUNTY, ARKANSAS DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS DISTRICT JUDGE
Mindy L. Green filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. She proceeds pro se and in forma
pauperis. She names as Defendants Dr. Roy Lee, the
Harrison Police Department, and Boone County, Arkansas.
case is before the Court for preservice screening under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
to the allegations of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 11),
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee being held in the Boone
County Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges that on May 8,
2018, she was refused treatment for Hepatitis C "because
they don't do that type of treatment at the
facility." Plaintiff additionally alleges she was
refused the right to see a physician about her medical
condition. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.
She also seeks a change in the Boone County Detention
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen a case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or, (2) seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). "In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold 'a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief
can be based. Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151, 1153
(8th Cir. 1993); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). "[A] pro se plaintiff requires
no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding
his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the
court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which
relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation,
under color of law, of a citizen's "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws" of the United States. In order to state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the
defendant acted under color of state law and that he violated
a right secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007,
1009 (8th Cir. 1999). The deprivation must be intentional;
mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for
deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). Considering
these legal standards, the Court finds that several of
Plaintiffs claims are subject to dismissal.
Plaintiffs claims against Dr. Lee are subject to dismissal.
Dr. Lee is a private physician employed by Mediquick. In
Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1997),
the Eighth Circuit set forth the analysis to be applied in
determining whether state action exists for purposes of
§ 1983. Specifically, the court said:
In ascertaining the presence of state action, we must examine
the record to determine whether "the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly
attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co.,457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d
482 (1982). Resolving this question entails a journey down a
particularly fact-bound path, see Id. at 939, 102
S.Ct. at 2754-55, but the Supreme Court has identified two
legal touchstones to provide guidance along the way. To begin
with, there can be no "fair attribution" unless the
alleged constitutional violation was "caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or
by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible." Id. at 937, 102
S.Ct. at 2753. Furthermore, "the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or ...