United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Hot Springs Division
RICKY A. JONES, PLAINTIFF
WARDEN N. FAUST, Ouachita River Correctional Unit “ORCU”; RORY GRIFFIN, Deputy Director of Health Services Administration, Correct Care Solutions CCS; DR. NANNETTE VOWELL, CCS; R. MORGAN, CCS; GWENDOLYN HART, CCS; NURSE C. ROBINSON; and JOHN or JANE DOE EYE DOCTOR DEFENDANTS
O. HICKEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and
in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is incarcerated in the
Ouachita River Correctional Unit of the Arkansas Department
of Correction (“ADC”).
the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Separate
Defendants Warden Faust and Rory Griffin. (ECF No. 29). The
Motion is limited to the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Plaintiff has responded to the
Motion. (ECF No. 49). The Court finds this matter ripe for
filed this action on March 29, 2018. With the exception of
Warden Faust, Plaintiff alleges Defendants are either current
or former employees of Correct Care Solutions (CCS), the
contract medical care provider for the ADC.
has Marfan disease. Prior to his incarceration at the ADC,
Plaintiff had been medically treated with contact lenses.
When Plaintiff was processed into the ADC, his contact lenses
were taken and he was told he would be accommodated with eye
glasses. With few exceptions, inmates in the ADC are not
allowed to wear contact lenses.
alleges Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs when they failed to provide him with
his medically prescribed eye wear. On August 27, 2015,
Plaintiff alleges he was seen by Dr. Perin and Dr. Uwaydat of
the Jones Eye Institute. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Uwaydat
recommended that Plaintiff be provided with contact lenses to
treat his Marfan disease. Further, Plaintiff maintains that
Dr. Uwaydat indicated that glasses would do nothing for
Plaintiff's eyesight and if he did not get the contact
lenses he was at risk of going blind. Dr. Uwaydat's
recommendation had to be approved by the ADC.
result of not receiving the contacts for over two years,
Plaintiff alleges he suffered physical injury when he
developed glaucoma and spontaneous subluxation of both
lenses. Plaintiff underwent the surgical removal of his left
and right lenses on January 12, 2017, and March 30, 2017,
judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record
“show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a
sufficient showing, the burden rests with the nonmoving party
to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence,
showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.”
Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165
F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
“They must show there is sufficient evidence to support
a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat'l
Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case
founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to
survive a motion for summary judgment.” (Id.)
(citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th
Defendants Faust and Griffin maintain that Plaintiff has not
exhausted his administrative remedies in regard to his claims
against them. Specifically, they state Plaintiff did not name
either of them in any grievance regarding his claim of
deliberate indifference to his vision care and that Plaintiff
failed to follow the ADC's grievance procedures. As such,
they maintain all claims against them must be dismissed.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides:
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). “Because exhaustion requirements are
designed to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust,
administrative law creates an incentive for these parties to
do what they would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to
give the agency a fair and ...