United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Hot Springs Division
AARIS D. JEFFERSON, SR. PLAINTIFF
LIEUTENANT SHAWN STAPLETON, CORPORAL STEED, DEPUTY COOLIS, DEPUTY BATES, CAPTAIN HALVERSON, and SERGEANT CARTER All of Garland County Detention Center DEFENDANTS
HOLMES, III CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
case is before the Court for preservice screening under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the
obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
filed his Complaint on May 22, 2018. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff
alleges his federal constitutional rights were violated when
he was incarcerated in the Garland County Detention Center
(GCDC). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that on January 13,
2018, he was attacked in the dayroom of “housing
D” by an Arkansas Department of Correction inmate
returning for court. As part of the incident, Plaintiff
alleges he was pepper-sprayed, taken to medical, and then
escorted to isolation. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges
Defendants Coolis and Stapleton failed to protect him from
this attack. (Id.).
attached grievance documents concerning the January incident.
The final appeal response stated Plaintiff was of the same
inmate classification status as the other inmate involved in
the classification, and nothing in Plaintiff's inmate
file indicated he could not be near this inmate.
(Id. at 4). The response also stated Plaintiff
received a disciplinary hearing for the incident, and that
Plaintiff admitted to engaging in “mutual combat”
with the inmate at the hearing. (Id.).
alleges Defendants Bates, Halverson, and Carter failed to
protect him on March 3, 2015. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff
does not describe any incident for this date, instead stating
only that regular inmates were housed with inmates of a
different status. (Id.).
proceeds against Defendants in their official capacity.
(Id. at 9, 10). He seeks compensatory and punitive
damages. (Id. at 12).
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even a
pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts
sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent,
780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
lists Defendant Steed at the beginning of his Complaint but
does not name him as an individual involved in any of his
claims. Without some personal involvement, Steed cannot be
held liable under § 1983. See e.g., Mark v.
Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1993) (section 1983
liability requires some personal involvement or
responsibility). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to state a
plausible claim against Defendant Steed.