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Manley v. Berryhill

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Northern Division

August 21, 2018

BRENDA K. MANLEY PLAINTIFF
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, performing the duties and functions not reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security DEFENDANT

          RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

         The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United States District Judge Billy Roy Wilson. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objections; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

         I. Introduction:

         Plaintiff, Brenda K. Manley, applied for disability benefits on March 24, 2014, alleging a disability onset date of October 20, 2013. (Tr. at 110). After conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied her application. (Tr. at 125). The Appeals Council denied her request for review. (Tr. at 1). Thus, the ALJ's decision now stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.

         For the reasons stated below, this Court should reverse the ALJ's decision and remand for further review.

         II. The Commissioner = s Decision:

         The ALJ found that Manley had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of October 20, 2013. (Tr. at 112). At Step Two, the ALJ found that Manley has the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, anxiety disorder, and affective disorder. (Tr. at 113).

         After finding that Manley's impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment (Tr. at 114), the ALJ determined that Manley had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of sedentary work, except that: (1) she could only occasionally stoop and crouch; (2) she requires an assistive device to ambulate more than 30 feet from the work station; (3) she is able to perform work where the interpersonal contact is incidental to the work performed, with “incidental” defined as interpersonal contact requiring a limited degree of interaction, such as meeting and greeting the public, answering simple questions, accepting payment, and making change; (4) the complexity of tasks in the workplace must be learned by demonstration or repetition within 30 days, with few variables and little judgment; and (5) the supervision required is simple, direct, and concrete. (Tr. at 116).

         The ALJ found that, based on Manley's RFC, Manley was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr. at 123). However, relying upon the testimony of the Vocational Expert (“VE”) at Step Five, the ALJ found that, based on Manley's age, education, work experience and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, including positions as a merchandise marker and a mail clerk. (Tr. at 124).[1] Thus, the ALJ found that Manley was not disabled. Id.

         III. Discussion:

         A. Standard of Review

         The Court's function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether it is based on legal error. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While “substantial evidence” is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, “substantial evidence on the record as a whole” requires a court to engage in a more scrutinizing analysis:

“[O]ur review is more than an examination of the record for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the Commissioner's decision; we also take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from that decision.” Reversal is not warranted, however, “merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.”

Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

         It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the ...


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