United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HON.
BARRY A. BRYANT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Daniel
Stewart (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant
to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act
(“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010),
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) denying his applications for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”), Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”), and a period of disability
under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The
Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case,
including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final
judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF
No. 5. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this
memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment
in this matter.
1.
Background:
Plaintiff
protectively filed his disability applications on July 19,
2014. (Tr. 135). In these applications, Plaintiff alleges
being disabled due to mental impairments, schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, and manic depression. (Tr. 236). Plaintiff
alleges an onset date of June 1, 2014. (Tr. 135). Her
applications were denied initially and again upon
reconsideration. (Tr. 80-131).
Plaintiff
requested an administrative hearing on his denied
applications. (Tr. 161). This hearing request was granted,
and Plaintiff's administrative hearing was held on July
7, 2016 in McAlester, Oklahoma. (Tr. 48-79). At this hearing,
Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, Greg
Giles. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert
(“VE”) Melissa Brassfield testified at this
hearing. Id.
On
October 25, 2016, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ
entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff's
disability applications. (Tr. 135-145). The ALJ determined
Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act
through March 31, 2017. (Tr. 137, Finding 1). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful
Activity (“SGA”) since June 1, 2014, his alleged
onset date. (Tr. 137, Finding 2). The ALJ determined
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: affective and
substance abuse disorders; and cervical degenerative disc
disease. (Tr. 137-138, Finding 3). The ALJ also determined
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meet or medically equal the requirements of
any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P
of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 138-140,
Finding 4).
In this
decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective
complaints and determined his Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”). (Tr. 140-143, Finding 5). First, the ALJ
evaluated Plaintiff' subjective complaints and found they
were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff had the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except the claimant cannot
perform overhead reaching bilaterally; is limited to
unskilled work (i.e., work which needs little or no judgment
to perform simple duties that can be learned on the job in a
short time period); requires simple, direct, concrete, and
uncritical supervision; is limited to interpersonal contact
with supervisors and coworkers that is incidental to the work
performed (e.g., assembly work); he should not be required to
work at a fast-paced produced speed; he must have normal and
regular work breaks with occasional workplace changes; and is
limited to occasional contact with the general public.
Id.
The ALJ
then evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”). (Tr. 143-144, Finding 6). Considering
his RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not retain the
capacity to perform his PRW. Id. The ALJ then
determined whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform
other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. (Tr. 144-145, Finding 10). The VE testified at the
administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id.
Specifically, the VE testified Plaintiff retained the
capacity to perform work as an industrial sweeper cleaner
(medium, unskilled) with 137, 000 such jobs in the nation and
groundskeeper (medium, unskilled) with 270, 000 such jobs in
the nation. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability (as
defined by the Act) from June 1, 2014 through the date of the
ALJ's decision or through October 25, 2016. (Tr. 145,
Finding 11).
Plaintiff
sought review with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 1-7). On
November 8, 2017, the Appeals Council denied this request for
review. Id. On November 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a
Complaint in this case. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs and have consented to the jurisdiction of this
Court. ECF Nos. 5, 12-13. This case is now ready for
determination.
2.
Applicable Law:
In
reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine
whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart,292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is
less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner's decision. See Johnson v. Apfel,240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is
substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it
simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that
would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court
would have decided the case differently. See Haley v.
Massanari,258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after
reviewing the record, it is possible to ...