United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
ORDER
SUSAN
O. HICKEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court is Defendant Arkansas Crime Information
Center's (“ACIC”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No.
8). Plaintiff Alisa Nelson (“Nelson”) has not
filed a reply and the time to do so has passed.[1] The Court finds
this matter ripe for consideration.
BACKGROUND
On
October 16, 2018, Nelson commenced this action alleging that
ACIC violated her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Specifically, Nelson alleges that ACIC reported
a false conviction on her criminal record in an effort to
defame her and otherwise adversely affect her. Nelson further
alleges that the false criminal conviction was the reason she
was denied two jobs.
On
December 18, 2018, ACIC filed its Motion to Dismiss, arguing
that it is entitled to sovereign immunity and is not a person
subject to suit under Section 1983. Nelson did not file a
reply, but on December 26, 2018, Nelson filed a Motion to
Proceed Without Dismissal, arguing that her case should not
be dismissed.[2]
LEGAL
STANDARD
To
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading
must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). The Court must accept as true all factual
allegations set forth in the complaint, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See
Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665
(8th Cir. 2009). However, the complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent
with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
. . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679. In considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the complaint should be
read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine
whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.”
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594
(8th Cir. 2009).
“A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or
‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Id. (internal
citations and alterations omitted) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 557). In other words, “the pleading
standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed
factual allegations,' but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)).
“In
evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537,
541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se
plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a
claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th
Cir. 1985).[3]
DISCUSSION
Nelson
has sued ACIC in its official and individual capacity
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[4]ACIC argues that Nelson's
claims should be dismissed because ACIC is not an entity
amenable to suit under Section 1983. Specifically, ACIC
argues that it cannot be sued in any capacity because ACIC is
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Moreover, ACIC argues it cannot be sued because it is not a
“person” within the meaning of Section 1983.
I.
Whether ACIC is Amenable to Suit Under Section 1983
The
Court will first address whether ACIC is immune from suit
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Then, the Court
will take up whether ACIC is a ...