United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HON.
BARRY A. BRYANT, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Curtis
Cornett, (“Plaintiff”) brings this action
pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security
Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010),
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) denying his application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the
Act.
The
Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case,
including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final
judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF
No. 5. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this
memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment
in this matter.
1.Background:
Plaintiff
protectively filed his application for SSI on August 10,
2014. (Tr. 10). In this application, Plaintiff alleges being
disabled due to panic attacks, social anxiety, learning
disability, and depression. (Tr. 212). Plaintiff alleges an
onset date of August 1, 2013. (Tr. 10). His application was
denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Id.
Plaintiff
requested an administrative hearing on his denied
application. (Tr. 93-95). The request was granted and
Plaintiff's administrative hearing was held on February
8, 2017. (Tr. 31-53). At this hearing, Plaintiff was present
and was represented by counsel, Greg Giles. Id.
Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Ivory
Youngblood testified at the hearing. Id. At the time
of the hearing, Plaintiff was twenty-seven (27) years old and
had completed the eleventh grade. (Tr. 36, 38).
Following
the hearing, on June 29, 2017, the ALJ entered an unfavorable
decision denying Plaintiff's application for SSI. (Tr.
10-19). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had
not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity
(“SGA”) since August 10, 2014. (Tr. 12, Finding
1). The ALJ then found Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder,
major depressive disorder, and borderline intellectual
functioning. (Tr. 12, Finding 2). Despite being severe, the
ALJ determined those impairments did not meet or medically
equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments
in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4
(“Listings”). (Tr. 12, Finding 3).
In this
decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective
complaints and determined his RFC. (Tr. 14-17, Finding 4).
First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective
complaints and found his claimed limitations were not
entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels, however he could understand, remember
and carry out simple, routine and repetitive tasks, but not
at a production rate pace; was limited to simple work-related
decisions; and could occasionally respond appropriately to
supervisors, coworkers and public. Id.
The ALJ
then evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”). (Tr. 17, Finding 5). The ALJ determined
Plaintiff had no PRW. Id. The ALJ, however, also
determined there was other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (Tr.
18, Finding 9). The ALJ based this determination upon the
testimony of the VE. Id. Specifically, the VE
testified that given all Plaintiff's vocational factors,
a hypothetical individual would be able to perform the
requirements of representative occupations such as laundry
laborer with approximately 335, 568 such jobs in the nation,
coffee maker with approximately 402, 037 such jobs in the
nation and, cleaner polisher with approximately 330, 567 such
jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon this finding, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as
defined in the Act, since August 10, 2014. (Tr. 18, Finding
10).
Thereafter,
Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council's review of the
ALJ's decision. (Tr. 179-180). The Appeals Council denied
this request for review. (Tr. 1-4). On March 6, 2018,
Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. Both Parties
have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 12, 15. This case is now
ready for decision.
2.Applicable
Law:
It is
well-established that a claimant for Social Security
disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her
disability by establishing a physical or mental disability
that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her
from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See
Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act
defines a “physical or mental impairment” as
“an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her
disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
To
determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a
disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step
sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the
claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful
activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
impairment that significantly limits the claimant's
physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or
equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the
regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard
to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the
claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to
perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the
claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the
national economy that the claimant can perform. See
Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the
plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light
of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is
reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920 (2003).
3.D ...