United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Johnson (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant
to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act
(“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010),
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) denying his applications for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) and Child Insurance
Benefits (“CDB”) under Titles II and XVI of the
Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case,
including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final
judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF
No. 5. Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a
final judgment in this matter.
protectively filed his disability applications on July 9,
2014 (SSI) and on July 15, 2014 (CDB). (Tr. 25). In his
applications, Plaintiff alleges he is disabled due to a
learning disability, headaches, and a mood disorder. (Tr.
237). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of January 1, 2006.
(Tr. 25). These applications were denied initially and again
upon reconsideration. (Tr. 69-122).
requested an administrative hearing on his denied
applications. This hearing request was granted, and
Plaintiff's administrative hearing was held on January
10, 2017. (Tr. 42-68). This hearing was held in Shreveport,
Louisiana on January 10, 2017. Id. At this hearing,
Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, Greg
Giles. Id. Only Plaintiff and Vocational Expert
(“VE”) Dale Thomas testified at this hearing.
this hearing, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying
his disability applications (Tr. 22-36). This decision was
entered on March 30, 2017. Id. In this decision, the
ALJ found Plaintiff was born on June 14, 1991 and had not
attained age 22 as of January 1, 2006, his alleged onset
date. (Tr. 27, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had
not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity
(“SGA”) since January 1, 2006, his alleged onset
date. (Tr. 27, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: intellectual disorder and
history of polysubstance abuse. (Tr. 27-29, Finding 3).
Despite being severe, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 25-27, Finding 4).
determined Plaintiff had a high school education and was able
to communicate in English. (Tr. 34, Finding 8). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff was fourteen (14) years old, which is
defined as an “younger individual” under 20
C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (2008) and 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(c) (2008). (Tr. 34, Finding 7).
decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective
complaints and determined his RFC. (Tr. 27-34, Finding 5).
First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff' subjective complaints
and found they were not entirely credible. Id.
Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels. Therefore, the claimant has no
restrictions on the amount of weight that he can lift and
carry. He can stand/walk for at least 6-hours out of an
8-hour workday and sit at least 6-hours in an 8-hour workday.
In addition, the claimant can perform pushing/pull operations
of arm or leg controls and can frequently stoop and crouch.
He has full manual dexterity and sufficient visual acuity to
perform close work, to handle large objects and to avoid
hazards in the workplace. However, the claimant has the
following nonexertional limitations: Claimant can only
perform simple, routine, and repetitive work tasks; is
limited to simple work-related decisions; and can only
occasionally interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the
then evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff had no PRW. (Tr.
34, Finding 9). The ALJ also considered whether Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 34-35,
Finding 10). The VE testified at the administrative hearing
regarding this issue. Id. Based upon that testimony,
the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform work
as a production worker (e.g., bench assembler) with
approximately 108, 000 such jobs in the nation; maid or house
cleaner (e.g., laundry worker) with approximately
306, 000 such jobs in the nation; and packer and hand
packager (e.g., machine-pack assembler) with 57, 000
such jobs in the nation. Id. Because Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as
defined by the Act, from January 1, 2006 through the date of
the ALJ's decision or through March 30, 2017. (Tr. 35,
sought review with the Appeals Council. On December 22, 2017,
the Appeals Council denied this request for review. (Tr.
5-8). On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in
this matter. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs
and have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. ECF
Nos. 5, 12-13. This case is now ready for determination.