APPEAL
FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 72CR-1896-583]
HONORABLE MARK LINDSAY, JUDGE
McLemore Law, Ltd., by: Kent McLemore, for appellant.
Leslie
Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass't
Att'y Gen., for appellee.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Karen
R. Baker, Associate Justice
This
appeal stems from appellant Christopher Segerstrom's
conviction and sentence in Washington County Circuit Court
for one count of capital murder and a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. Segerstrom v.
State, 301 Ark. 314, 783 S.W.2d 847 (1990). At the time
of the offense on July 26, 1986, Segerstrom was fifteen-years
old.[1]
In
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), the
Supreme Court of the United States held that "the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders." The Court further held that defendants who
committed homicide crimes as juveniles and faced a sentence
of life without parole were entitled to a sentencing hearing
that would permit a judge or jury to consider the individual
characteristics of the defendant and the individual
circumstances of the crime as mitigating factors for a lesser
sentence. Id. at 489; Robinson v. State,
2018 Ark. 353, at 2, S.W.3d .
Following
Miller, and this court's opinions in Jackson
v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d, 906 and Kelley
v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, 465 S.W.3d 842, Segerstrom
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Hot Spring
County Circuit Court on the ground that he was a juvenile
when he committed the crime and was entitled to have his
sentence vacated pursuant to Miller. On September
19, 2016, the circuit court granted Segerstrom's petition
for writ of habeas corpus, vacated his sentencing order and
remanded Segerstrom's case to Washington County for
resentencing.
On
April 24, 2017, the State filed a motion for resentencing in
the Washington County Circuit Court pursuant to the Fair
Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA). Act of Mar. 20,
2017, No. 539, 2017 Ark Acts 2615. On May 3, the circuit
court held a hearing on the matter. On May 17, the circuit
court entered an order denying Segerstrom's request for a
resentencing hearing and sentenced Segerstrom to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty
years based on the FSMA. The circuit court held that the FSMA
eliminated "life without parole as a sentencing option
for minors and [created] more age-appropriate sentencing
standards in compliance with the United States Constitution
for minors who commit serious crimes." The circuit court
further held that the FSMA went into effect on March 21,
2017, when it was signed by the governor and applied
retroactively. On June 16, Segerstrom filed a motion to
reconsider and on June 28, the circuit court denied the
motion to reconsider, holding that the FSMA applied
retroactively.
Segerstrom
appeals and presents five issues: (1) the circuit court erred
when it retroactively applied the penalty and parole
provisions of the FSMA to resentence Segerstrom to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty
years; (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that juvenile
capital murderers who were sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole are entitled to be resentenced, and denying
Segerstrom the relief granted to other
Miller-Jackson defendants violates the federal and
state constitutional rights of due process, equal protection
and fundamental fairness; (3) neither the retroactive
parole-eligibility provision of the FSMA nor the holding in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S., 136 S.Ct. 718
(2016), invalidate the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding
in Jackson, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906, and
Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, 465 S.W.3d 842; (4)
Miller requires that Segerstrom receive
"individualized" resentencing by a "judge or
jury," 567 U.S. at 489, and a parole hearing under
section 13 of the FSMA satisfies neither of those
requirements; and (5) the FSMA, as applied to Segerstrom,
violates the federal and state constitutional guarantee
against ex post facto legislation. We reverse and remand.
Points
on Appeal
For his
first point on appeal, Segerstrom relies on Harris v.
State, 2018 Ark. 179, at 14, 547 S.W.3d 64, to contend
that the circuit court erred when it retroactively applied
the penalty and parole provisions of the FSMA to resentence
Segerstrom to life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole after thirty years. Segerstrom asserts that, like
Harris, he is a
Miller-Jackson
inmate, no longer serving a sentence to which the
parole-eligibility provision of the FSMA could attach to and
the circuit court's decision must be reversed. The State
responds that the circuit court correctly ruled that the FSMA
retroactively applied to Segerstrom. The State further
responds that Harris was wrongly decided and should
be overruled.
In
Harris, 2018 Ark. 179, 547 S.W.3d 64, we addressed
the issue presented in this case and held that the penalty
provisions of the FSMA are not retroactive. Further, we held
that the revised punishment for juveniles convicted of
capital murder applies only to crimes committed on or after
the effective date of the FSMA-March 20, 2017. Id.
at 14, 547 S.W.3d at 71. Accordingly, we held that the
parole-eligibility provision did not apply at the time of
Harris's hearing on his motion for resentencing because
"by its plain language, the provision applies only to
those juvenile offenders who are serving a sentence for
either capital or first-degree murder." Id. at
11, 547 S.W.3d at 70. We held that because Harris's
sentence was vacated in 2016, Harris was no longer serving a
sentence to which parole eligibility could attach.
Id. Therefore, the FSMA parole-eligibility provision
did not apply to Harris at the time of his hearing because
after his original sentence was vacated, Harris was no longer
serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach.
Id.
Recently,
in Robinson, 2018 Ark. 353, S.W.3d, we referenced
our decision in Harris and held that the circuit
court erred in applying the FSMA to Robinson's case and
that Robinson was entitled to a hearing to present
Miller evidence for consideration. Robinson, like
Harris, committed his crime before the effective date of the
FSMA, and we held that the FSMA penalty provisions did not
apply. Robinson's sentence was vacated by the circuit
court in 2016 and Robinson, like Harris, was no longer
serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach.
Accordingly, the parole-eligibility provision of the FSMA did
not apply to Robinson at the time of his hearing. Based on
our decision in Harris, we held that the circuit
court erred in applying the FSMA to Robinson's case and
Robinson was entitled to a hearing to present Miller
evidence for consideration and sentencing within the
discretionary range for a Class Y felony, which is ten to
forty years or ...