United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
O. HICKEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Randy Glenn pursuant
to 42. U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se
and in forma pauperis. The case is before the Court
for preservice screening under the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen
any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
filed his Complaint on January 9, 2019. (ECF No. 1). His
application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted
the same day. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff is currently
incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction-North
Central Unit and is serving a sentence as a result of a
judgment of conviction. (ECF No. 1, p. 2).
has named the following Defendants in this lawsuit: the State
of Arkansas; Lisa Mills Wilkins-Parole Revocation Hearing
Judge; Jason Taggart-Plaintiff's parole officer; and
Tomekia Williamson, the parole officer's supervisor.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants denied him due process and
equal protection when they “filed a revocation report,
and had a hearing on some charges that I had not been
convicted off, sent me to prison.” (ECF No. 1, p. 4).
He also states, “on are about, July 11, 2017 a warrant
was issued for retaking my parole. I served 90 days then on
August 16, 2017, charges was filed on me, on 11-16-18 over a
year later I was convicted of 6 year double jeopardy.”
Id. at p. 5. Plaintiff is suing Defendants in both
their individual and official capacities. He is seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at p. 7.
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
However, a pro se plaintiff must allege specific
facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v.
Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
Claims Against the State of Arkansas
names the State of Arkansas as a Defendant. However, states
and state agencies are not “persons” subject to
suit under section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 & 70 (1989). Further, the
State of Arkansas is immune from suit. “The sovereign
immunity of the States recognized in the Eleventh Amendment
bars any suit brought in federal court against a state or
state agency, regardless of the nature of the relief sought,
unless Congress has abrogated the States' immunity or a
state has consented to suit or waived its immunity.”
Rush v. Perryman, 2007 WL 2091745, at *3 (E.D. Ark.
July 17, 2007) (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996)). Arkansas and its agencies and
officials have not consented to suit in federal court.
See Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492-93 (8th Cir.
1991). Also, Congress did not abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. Accordingly, the State of Arkansas is entitled
to sovereign immunity and is immune from suit in this Court.
Because Arkansas is immune from suit and is not a
“person” subject to suit under section 1983, the
Court finds that all claims against the State of Arkansas
should be dismissed.
Claims against Defendant Wilkins
Wilkins is an administrative law judge who presided over
Plaintiff's parole revocation proceedings. Judges are
generally immune from lawsuits. See Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“[J]udicial immunity is an
immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of
damages.”); Duty v. City of Springdale, 42
F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994) (judges are generally immune
from suit for money damages); Robinson v. Freeze, 15
F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Judges performing
judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983
liability.”). Judicial immunity is only overcome in two
situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and
(2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he
will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the
clear absence of all jurisdiction.”) (internal
has failed to allege any action by Judge Wilkins that was
non-judicial or taken without jurisdiction. ...