United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fort Smith Division
STACEY MORRIS o/b/o K. M. a minor and MICHAEL MORRIS deceased PLAINTIFF
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Commissioner Social Security Administration DEFENDANT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
HONORABLE MARK E. FORD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff,
Stacey Morris, brings this action on behalf of K. M., a minor
child and next of kin to Michael Morris, deceased, under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying his claim for a period
of disability and disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act
(hereinafter “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). In this judicial review, the Court must
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the
administrative record to support the Commissioner's
decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
protectively filed his application for DIB on April 16, 2014,
alleging an onset date of April 14, 2014, due to insulin
dependent diabetes, knee and hand pain, social anxiety,
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”), bipolar disorder, methicillin resistant
staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”), and substance
abuse. (ECF No. 10, pp. 128, 239-247, 267-268). Based on his
work credits, the Commissioner determined that the Plaintiff
met the insured status requirements of the Act through March
30, 2017. (Id. at 21).
Plaintiff's
application was denied at both the initial and
reconsideration levels. An administrative hearing was held on
July 27, 2016. (Id. at 51-107). Plaintiff was
present and represented by counsel.
On
October 18, 2016, the ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff's
insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, history of left knee
surgery, history of left elbow fracture, ADHD, bipolar
disorder, adjustment disorder, panic disorder, other
specified personality disorder with mixed features, and
history of polysubstance abuse were severe but did not meet
or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix
1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Id. at 22). The ALJ
found Plaintiff capable of performing a full range of work at
all exertional levels, but with the following non-exertional
limitations: can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl; should avoid concentrated exposure to
temperature extremes, particularly extreme heat; should avoid
even moderate exposure to hazards, including not driving as
part of work; and, is able to perform work where the
interpersonal contact is incidental to work performed, the
complexity of tasks is learned and performed by rote with few
variables and little judgment involved, and the supervision
required is simple, direct, and concrete. (Id. at
24). With the assistance of a vocational expert, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff could perform work as a machine
packager, busboy, routing clerk, marking clerk, document
preparer, and pari-mutuel ticket checker. (Id. at
30).
The
request for review was denied by the Appeals Council on
February 1, 2018, and the ALJ's decision became the
Commissioner's final decision for judicial review.
(Id. at 6-12).
Plaintiff
then filed this action. (ECF No. 1). This matter is before
the undersigned for report and recommendation. Both parties
have filed appeal briefs (ECF Nos. 12, 13), and the case is
now ready for decision.
II.
APPLICABLE LAW
This
Court's role is to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner's findings. Vossen v.
Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that
a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner's decision. Teague v. Astrue, 638
F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2011). We must affirm the ALJ's
decision if the record contains substantial evidence to
support it. Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858
(8th Cir. 2014). So long as there is substantial evidence in
the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence
exists in the record that would have supported a contrary
outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case
differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477
(8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the
record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from
the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, we must affirm the ALJ's decision.
Id.
A
claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the
burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical
or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and
that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful
activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217
(8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental
impairment” as “an impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not
simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve
consecutive months.
The
Commissioner's regulations require her to apply a
five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for
disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in
substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental
impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the
impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings;
(4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing
past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to
perform other work in the national economy given his age,
education, and experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Only if he reaches the final stage does the fact finder
consider the Plaintiff's age, education, and work
experience in light of his residual functional capacity.
McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir.
1982), abrogated on other grounds by Higgins v.
Apfel, 222 F.3d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
raises three issues on appeal: (a) whether the ALJ fully and
fairly developed the record; (b) whether the ALJ failed to
properly evaluate the Plaintiff's subjective complaints
and apply the Polaski factors; and, (c) whether the
ALJ's RFC determination is supported by substantial
evidence. Of concern to the undersigned is the ALJ's RFC
determination. RFC is the most a person can do despite that
person's limitations. 20 C.F.R.' 404.1545. “The
ALJ determines a claimant's RFC based on all relevant
evidence in the record, including medical records,
observations of treating physicians and others, and the
claimant's own descriptions of his or her
limitations.” Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963,
971 (8th Cir. 2010); Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d
838, 844 (8th Cir. 2009). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant's
residual functional capacity is a medical question.”
Miller, 784 F.3d at 479 (citing Lauer v.
Apfel,2 ...