United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
HON.
BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff
proceeds in this matter pro se and in forma
pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011),
the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District
Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose
of making a Report and Recommendation.
The
case is before the Court for preservice screening under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the
obligation to screen any Complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed his Complaint on December 28, 2018. (ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently
incarcerated in the Sevier County Jail. (Id. at 2).
He alleges his constitutional rights were violated by a
denial of access to the courts, by the loss of personal
property, and by unsanitary living conditions in the jail.
(Id. at 6-9). Specifically, he alleges he was denied
access to the courts for his pending criminal case through
inadequate assistance of counsel from his court-appointed
public defender and the lack of a law library in the jail. He
also alleges he was arrested on August 6, 2018, and held for
eight weeks before being formally charged.[1] (Id. at
4-7). Finally, he states he has not received a Motion for
Discovery. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff names Defendants
Gentry, Wolcott, Barrett, Buchanen, Ray, and the Sevier
County Quorum Court in this claim. (Id. at 6).
Plaintiff
alleges his personal property was incorrectly given to his
girlfriend when she was released from the jail. This property
included his wallet, cash, gift cards, an EBT card, his
Social Security card, food stamps, and the title to his
pickup truck. As a result, he has lost this personal
property. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff names Defendants
Lindsey, Alverdo, Wolcott, Gentry, and the Sevier County
Detention Center in this claim. (Id.).
Finally,
he alleges he was placed in an isolation cell which contained
blood and feces on the walls, bed, and floor, which exposed
him to disease. (Id. at 8). He alleges he was told
to clean the cell but was not given cleaning materials or
gloves. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff names Defendants
Cooke, Gentry, Wolcott, Alverdo, and Lindsey in this claim.
Plaintiff
proceeds against all Defendants in their personal and
official capacity. (Id. at 6-8). Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages. He also seeks access to a
law library on a reasonable daily schedule, the return of his
property, and the appointment of a lawyer who will represent
him. (Id. at 9).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b).
A claim
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even a
pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts
sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent,
780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Circuit Judge Tom Cooper
Judge
Cooper is immune from suit. See Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ("judicial immunity is an immunity
from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of
damages"); Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d
460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994) (judges are generally immune from
suit for money damages); Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d
107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Judges performing judicial
functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983
liability."). Judicial immunity is only overcome in two
situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and
(2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11; see alsoStump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be
deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error,
...