United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, El Dorado Division
ORDER
SUSAN
O. HICKEY CHIEF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court is the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and to
Expedite (ECF No. 50) filed by Intervenors Arkansas
Department of Education and Arkansas State Board of
Education. (“ADE and SBE”). Defendant Junction
City School District (“Junction City”) has
responded. (ECF No. 54). The Court finds the matter ripe for
consideration.
I.
BACKGROUND
On
January 17, 2019, the Court entered an order (the
“modification order”) modifying a desegregation
order (“the 1970 Order”) that applies to Junction
City to explicitly prohibit the segregative interdistrict
transfer of students from Junction City to other school
districts, unless such a transfer is requested for education
or compassionate purposes and is approved by Junction
City's school board on a case-by-case
basis.[1] (ECF No. 47). On February 15, 2019, the
ADE and SBE filed a notice of appeal as to the modification
order. That same day, the ADE and SBE filed the instant
motion, asking the Court to issue a stay of the modification
order pending the outcome of the appeal and asking the Court
to shorten the other parties' time to respond to the
instant motion. On February 20, 2019, the Court denied the
ADE and SBE's request to shorten the other parties'
response time. (ECF No. 52.) On March 1, 2019, Junction City
filed a response opposing the instant motion. (ECF No. 54).
For the
reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the ADE and SBE
have not met their burden to receive a temporary
administrative stay of the modification order or a full stay
pending the appeal of the modification order.
II.
DISCUSSION
In
deciding whether to grant a motion to stay an order pending
appeal, the Court considers the following four factors: (1)
the likelihood of the movant's success on the merits of
the appeal; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably harmed
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay would
substantially injure the non-moving party; and (4) where the
public interest lies.[2] Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.
770, 776 (1987). Courts must consider the relative strength
of the four factors, balancing them all, with the most
important factor being the likelihood of success on appeal.
Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 640 F.3d 785,
789 (8th Cir. 2011). As the moving parties, the ADE and SBE
bear the burden of proving that the weight of the four
factors warrant a stay. See James River Flood Control
Ass'n v. Watt, 680 F.2d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). With this standard in mind, the Court will now
address each of the four factors as they relate to the
instant motion for a stay pending appeal.
A.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The
first factor asks whether the moving party is likely to
succeed on appeal. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776. The
moving party need not establish an absolute certainty of
success. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C., 109 F.3d 418,
423 (8th Cir. 1996).
The
modification order found that modification of the 1970 Order
was proper because a significant change in law warranted
revision of the order and because the proposed modification
was suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. In the
present motion, the ADE and SBE advance three arguments as to
why the Court's ruling is likely to be reversed on
appeal: (1) that no significant change in law occurred to
warrant modification and that the Court misinterpreted the
1970 Order, (2) that the modification was not suitably
tailored because it imposed an impermissible interdistrict
remedy, and (3) the modification order unlawfully violates
students' equal protection rights. The Court will
separately address each of these arguments.
1.
Significant Change in Facts or Law
The ADE
and SBE's first argument is that the changes to the
relevant Arkansas school choice statutes was not a
significant change in law justifying modification because the
1970 Order did not explicitly concern the interdistrict
transfer of students from Junction City to elsewhere.
Specifically, the ADE and SBE argue that the relevant
statutory changes were not significant changes in law because
Junction City did not show that the law had an actual effect
on the 1970 Order, thereby making it unworkable. This
argument is repetitive of an argument that the ADE and SBE
previously made in the underlying briefing that gave way to
the Court's modification order, and that the Court
expressly considered and rejected. Without restating the
entire modification order, the Court found[3] that
“changes in the governing school-choice statutory
framework-and the ensuing requirements and limitations-have
an actual effect on Junction City's ability to comply
with the 1970 Order.” (ECF No. 47, p. 13). The Court
reasoned that the 2017 Act requires that, for Junction City
to receive an exemption from school choice, the 1970 Order
must contain specific restrictive language that was not
required from the time the 1970 Order was entered up until
the 2017 Act was put into effect. Thus, the 2017 Act prevents
Junction City from claiming an exemption from participating
in school choice, thereby presenting a change in law that
justified modification of the order.
The ADE
and SBE also argue that the Court misinterpreted the 1970
Order. They argue that this case and the 1970 Order have
nothing to do with the interdistrict transfer of students,
and the parties involved and the Court itself did not believe
that the 1970 Order encompassed that subject. Thus, they
argue that the Court erred by looking beyond the four corners
of the 1970 Order and finding that the intent of the 1970
Order was to prohibit student transfers which result in the
segregation of Junction City's student body.
The
Court's modification order considered and rejected this
argument, finding that the1970 Order “clearly intended
to prohibit any racial discrimination occurring
within Junction City, including preventing student transfers
which result in segregation of Junction City's student
body.” (ECF No. 47, p. 12). In reaching this
conclusion, the Court was mindful of the Eighth Circuit's
instruction that courts interpreting a consent decree
“are not to ignore the context in which the parties
were operating, nor the circumstances surrounding the
order.” United States v. Knote, 29 F.3d 1297,
1300 (8th Cir. 1994). Although the Court noted that the 1970
Order did not expressly prohibit the interdistrict transfer
of students, the Court also considered the context in which
the parties were operating and the circumstances surrounding
the order, thereby finding that it was unnecessary for 1970
Order to be drafted “in a way that explicitly barred
segregative inter-district student transfers because
inter-district student transfers, such as those contemplated
by the 2013 Act, 2015 Act, and 2017 Act, did not exist when
the 1970 Order was entered.” (ECF No. 47, p. 12). Thus,
the Court did not misconstrue the 1970 Order, but rather
interpreted it by looking to its content and language and by
properly considering the context and circumstances in which
it was entered.[4]
For the
above reasons and for the reasons stated in the modification
order, the Court finds that the ADE and SBE are unlikely to
succeed on appeal with arguments that the Court previously
considered and rejected. Cf. St. Jude Med., Inc. v.
Access Closure, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-4101-HFB, 2012 WL
12919351, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2012) (“[I]f the
Court thought [the movant's] position was likely to
succeed on appeal, the Court would not have decided against
[the movant] in the first place.”). The ADE and SBE
have presented no additional argument or on-point caselaw to
cause the Court to reverse course from its prior ruling.
Thus, the Court finds that they are unlikely to succeed on
appeal with these arguments.
2.
Interdistrict Remedy
The ADE
and SBE further argue that the modification order imposes an
impermissible “interdistrict remedy, ” and is,
therefore, not suitably tailored to the changed circumstances
outlined by the Court. The ADE and SBE assert that the
claimed interdistrict remedy is inappropriate because the
1970 Order only concerned alleged intradistrict violations.
This line of argument was addressed and found unpersuasive in
the modification order. (ECF No. 47, p. 15). Specifically,
the Court observed that the modification would not directly
restrict any other school district's actions. That being
said, the Court noted that the modification would have an
indirect impact on other school districts in that they would
be unable to receive Junction City students via school choice
transfers because Junction City would be barred from granting
segregative interdistrict transfers. However, the Court
stated that the ADE and SBE had cited no binding authority
finding that a remedy like the modification constituted an
interdistrict remedy and that the Court was unaware of any
such authority.[5] The Court further noted instances in which
courts had found that the remedy implemented was
interdistrict, such as forced consolidation of school
districts, imposition of an interdistrict magnet school plan,
and creation of an interdistrict student bussing
plan.[6] (ECF No. 47, p. 16).
The ADE
and SBE now attempt to re-litigate this issue. To the extent
that the ADE and SBE present the same or substantially
similar arguments as previously addressed by the modification
order, the Court again finds those arguments unpersuasive.
The ADE and SBE, however, do present one new, though similar,
argument that was not raised in the briefing of the
underlying motion. Specifically, the ADE and SBE assert that
the granted modification is impermissible because it had an
“interdistrict purpose, ” arguing that a remedy
that has an interdistrict purpose “is impermissible in
cases with no interdistrict violation.” (ECF No. 51,
pp. 11-12). The ADE and SBE state that:
The Court's Modification Order undoubtedly has such an
“interdistrict purpose.” Indeed, its express
purpose is to affect the racial demographics of Junction City
relative to the surrounding districts. Because the
Modification Order's purpose is to affect the racial
makeup of Junction City relative to the surrounding schools
by preventing student ...