United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Eastern Division
JOHN G. WINSTON REG. #28648-009 PETITIONER
v.
ANTHONY HAYNES, Warden, FCI - Forrest City RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM OPINION [1]
THOMAS
RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I.
Introduction
Pending
before the Court is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner, John G. Winston
(“Winston”), who is incarcerated at the Forrest
City, Arkansas, Federal Correctional Institution. Doc. 1.
Winston challenges the sentence imposed, pursuant to a guilty
plea, by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas in United States v. Winston,
4:14-CR-00124-SWW (“Winston I”). The relevant
facts supporting Winston's collateral attack on his
federal sentence are set forth below.
On May
13, 2015, Winston pleaded guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Winston I. The Government
argued that Winston was subject to the Armed Career Criminal
Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because
he had three or more earlier convictions for a “serious
drug offense, ” or a “violent felony.”
Winston, through counsel, denied that he had the qualifying
felonies required to subject him to the fifteen-year
mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA. Following a
sentencing hearing on this issue, the sentencing Court agreed
with the Government. On November 17, 2015, Winston was
sentenced to imprisonment for 188 months. Doc. 10-1 (copy of
Winston I Judgment); Winston I, Docs. 50-51 (Transcript of
Sentencing Hearing).
Winston
appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. While admitting that he had two qualifying prior
convictions, he disputed whether either of his two remaining
convictions, for second-degree battery and first-degree
terroristic threatening, were “violent felonies”
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). On
January 10, 2017, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the district court “properly counted the battery
conviction as a violent felony.”[2] United States
v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2017)
(“Winston II”).
On July
6, 2017, Winston filed a motion in the sentencing court to
vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Winston I, Doc. 57. Winston argued that: (1) the sentencing
court erred in applying the sentencing enhancement; (2) his
attorney (and the Assistant United States Attorney)
“misinformed” the district court that it should
apply the “modified categorical approach” in
assessing his prior felonies; and (3) his prior burglary and
terroristic threatening convictions were not
“qualifying felonies.” Winston I, Doc. 57. On
December 15, 2017, the Winston I court denied Winston's
§ 2255 motion. Winston I, Doc. 60; Doc. 10-2.
Winston
attempted to appeal the denial of § 2255 relief to the
Eighth Circuit, which denied Winston's request for a
certificate of appealability. Winston I, Doc.
72.
On
November 16, 2018, Winston filed the § 2241 habeas
action now before this Court. In his § 2241 petition, he
once again argues that he should not have been sentenced
under the ACCA and requests “resentencing without the
ACCA enhancement.” Doc. 1.
Respondent
has filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Winston's
§ 2241 Petition. Winston has filed a Reply. Doc.
12. Thus, the issues are joined and ready for
resolution.
II.
Discussion
Jurisdiction
over a federal prisoner's collateral attack on his
conviction or sentence is governed by the well-recognized
distinction between claims that attack the validity
of a federal conviction or sentence, and claims that
challenge the execution of a federal sentence. As a
general rule, collateral challenges to a federal conviction
or sentence must be raised in a motion to vacate
filed in the sentencing court under 28 U.S.C. §
2255, rather than by a habeas petition filed in the court
of incarceration under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Lopez-Lopez v. Sanders, 590 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.
2010); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th
Cir. 2004). Because a § 2255 motion attacks the validity
of the conviction or sentence, it is “a further step in
the movant's criminal case, ” and subject matter
jurisdiction lies with the court which convicted and
sentenced the federal prisoner. DeSimone v. Lacy,
805 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1986); Thompson v.
Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1983).
A
limited exception to this rule is found in the “savings
clause” of § 2255(e), which permits a federal
court in the district of incarceration to entertain a §
2241 habeas petition challenging the validity of a conviction
or sentence only if there medy under § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089,
1091 (8th Cir. 2003). A petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or
ineffective. Lopez-Lopez, 590 F.3d at 907;
Hill, 349 F.3d at 1091.
For the
“savings clause” to apply, “more is
required than demonstrating that there is a procedural
barrier to bringing a § 2255 motion.” United
States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000). A
§ 2255 motion is not “inadequate or
ineffective” merely because: (1) “§ 2255
relief has already been denied;” (2) the
“petitioner has been denied permission to file a second
or successive § 2255 motion;” (3) “a second
or successive § 2255 motion has been dismissed;”
or (4) the “petitioner has allowed the one year statute
of limitations and/or grace period to expire.”
Id.
In
addition, the Eighth Circuit has consistently held that the
“savings clause” may not be invoked to raise an
issue under § 2241 which could have been, or
actually was, raised in a direct appeal or a § 2255
motion in the sentencing district. Lopez-Lopez, 590
F.3d ...