Submitted: October 16, 2018
Appeal
from United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota - Minneapolis
Before
WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
COLLOTON, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Anmarie
Calgaro sued several parties alleging violations of her
parental rights over one of her minor children under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court[1] granted the defendants' dispositive
motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Calgaro
appeals, and we affirm.
According
to Calgaro's complaint, she is the mother of E.J.K. and
three younger, minor children. In May 2015, E.J.K. moved out
of Calgaro's home in St. Louis County, Minnesota. Calgaro
never surrendered her parental rights, but E.J.K. obtained a
letter from Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid describing E.J.K.'s
father and Calgaro as "hav[ing] given up control and
custody of their child." The letter concluded that
E.J.K. was therefore "legally emancipated under
Minnesota law."
Although
this letter from a legal aid association had no legal effect,
E.J.K. presented the letter to several state agencies as
evidence of emancipation. Under Minnesota law, a child under
age eighteen is eligible for general public assistance if she
is "legally emancipated." Minn. Stat. §
256D.05, subdiv. 1(a)(9). Based on E.J.K.'s claims of
emancipation, St. Louis County provided E.J.K. with funding
for medical services and other living expenses, and E.J.K.
obtained gender transition care from Park Nicollet Health
Services. E.J.K. also received prescription medication from
Fairview Health Services. Both providers thought E.J.K. could
give effective consent to treatment under Minnesota law
because she was living apart from her parents and managing
her personal financial matters. See Minn. Stat.
§ 144.341.
When
Calgaro attempted to acquire E.J.K.'s medical records
from Park Nicollet and Fairview, both providers denied her
request under the standard of Minnesota Statutes §
144.346. That provision allows disclosure of treatment
information if "failure to inform the parent or guardian
would seriously jeopardize the health of the minor
patient." Id. Calgaro also approached the St.
Louis County School District and Michael Johnson, the
principal of E.J.K.'s high school, requesting access to
E.J.K.'s educational records and an opportunity to
participate in certain educational decisions. Johnson and the
School District denied those requests.
Calgaro
then sued St. Louis County, the interim director of St. Louis
County Public Health and Human Services (individually and in
her official capacity), medical providers Fairview and Park
Nicollet, the St. Louis County School District, Principal
Johnson (individually and in his official capacity), and
E.J.K., as an interested party. She alleged that the
defendants had violated a fundamental right of a parent,
under the Due Process Clause, to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of her children. Calgaro
claimed damages and also sought declaratory and injunctive
relief that would prevent the defendants from providing
services to any of her minor children until a state court
adjudicated the scope of her parental rights.
Calgaro
moved for summary judgment, and the defendants filed
cross-motions in response. St. Louis County moved for
judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment, and the
other defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court granted the defendants'
motions, denied Calgaro's motion, and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. We review those dismissals de
novo.
The
district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for
St. Louis County (including the official-capacity claim
against the interim director) because Calgaro did not
adequately plead a claim under § 1983. A county may be
liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 only
if the violation resulted from a policy or custom of the
municipality. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). There is no respondeat
superior liability for actions of an individual
employee. Id. at 691. Although Calgaro alleges that
the County's "policies, customs, practices, or
procedures (or lack of procedures)" led to violations of
her due process rights, she never specified a policy or
custom that was the moving force behind the alleged
violation. She pleads only that the County
"determined" that E.J.K. was emancipated and paid
for her medical services. But one erroneous determination by
a county employee that E.J.K. was emancipated does not
establish a policy or custom of the County that deprives
parents of their constitutional rights. Calgaro's
conclusory assertion that the County acted based on a policy
or custom is insufficient to state a claim, and the district
court correctly granted judgment on the pleadings.
Calgaro
also fails to state a claim for damages against the
then-interim director of Public Health and Human Services,
Linnea Mirsch. The complaint lists Mirsch's position and
title, and alleges that "[t]he director is the final
decision and policy maker for the Department." But the
complaint does not allege that Mirsch personally took any
action that violated Calgaro's constitutional rights, and
Mirsch cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of
her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
676 (2009). The district court correctly ruled that Calgaro
failed to state a claim against Mirsch in her individual
capacity.
Calgaro's
claims for money damages against the medical providers fare
no better. To state a claim under § 1983, Calgaro must
show that Park Nicollet and Fairview acted "under color
of state law." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Although both
facilities provided medical services to E.J.K. without
parental consent, and allegedly honored E.J.K.'s consent
in accordance with § 144.341 of the Minnesota Statutes,
these actions did not transform either medical provider into
a state actor. 526 U.S. at 52. Calgaro contends that the
providers exercised a "public function" by
terminating her parental rights concerning health care
decisions, but this claim mischaracterizes what happened.
Section 144.341 states that certain minors may give effective
consent to medical services, but a provider does not
terminate parental rights by recognizing a minor's
consent, even if the provider is mistaken. Only a Minnesota
court can terminate parental rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301.
Calgaro
next claims that the St. Louis County School District
(including Principal Johnson in his official capacity)
violated her rights by carrying out a "policy, practice,
and custom" of declining to give notice or to hold a
hearing with parents before determining that a minor student
is emancipated. We agree with the district court that Calgaro
alleged only a legal conclusion on this point. The complaint
identifies no actual policy or established custom of the
District about making emancipation determinations. Calgaro
cites only the single incident at issue here, in which the
District refused to disclose E.J.K.'s educational records
or to allow Calgaro to participate in E.J.K.'s
educational decisions. The District's alleged ...